


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



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RESPONSES TO LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM
(1980-1994): A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
by

Bradley D. Voigt

December, 1994

Thesis Advisors:

Maria Moyano
Glenn Robinson

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1983

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines four responses to Libyan-sponsored terrorism: the 1982 American embargo, the 1984 American request to Europe for economic sanctions, the 1986 American bombing raid on Tripoli, and the 1992 United Nations economic sanctions. The rationale leading up to each response is analyzed from American political, diplomatic and security points of view. Two measures are developed to judge the effectiveness of each response: an economic indicator which determines the impact of each response on Libyan exports, and the rise or fall in Libyan-sponsored terrorist incidents before and after each response. Five Hypotheses are introduced which attempt to explain the interaction of states in the international system when faced with alleged state-sponsored terrorism. Each response is critiqued using the five hypotheses and also the measures of effectiveness. Following this critique, the thesis concludes that a firm military and flexible diplomatic response is the most effective response to state-sponsored terrorism.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines four responses to Libyan-sponsored terrorism: the 1982 American embargo, the 1984 American request for economic sanctions, the 1986 American bombing raid on Tripoli, and the 1992 United Nations economic sanctions. The five hypotheses shown below are introduced to explain the interaction of Western states when faced with alleged Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

-Hypothesis One: If American national interests are threatened by Libyan terrorism, then the United States will take some unilateral action (military, economic or political) or campaign for multilateral initiatives that threaten Libyan national interests, in an attempt to deter this threatening behavior.

-Hypothesis Two: If European national interests are not threatened, then European states will not be inclined to support United States actions.

-Hypothesis Three: If European national interests are threatened, then European states will take some kind of action against Libyan national interests which may coincide with United States actions.

-Hypothesis Four: If a European country has strong economic ties with Libya, then its ability or willingness to take strong economic action will decrease.

-Hypothesis Five: If Libyan national interests are severely threatened, then Libya will decrease its sponsorship of terrorism.

Each of the four responses are treated as case studies of the four possible reactions to state-sponsored terrorism presented in Hypothesis One. The chain of events leading up to each response are analyzed from American political, diplomatic, and security points of view. Emphasis is placed on defining the threat that Libyan-sponsored terrorism represented to American national interests at the time each response was implemented. This is done by examining State Department papers that were published with the sole purpose of documenting

Libyan terrorism activity. From these publications a chronology is developed which represents the actual information State Department personnel based their decisions on.

Two measures are developed to judge the effectiveness of each response: an economic indicator which determines the impact of each response on Libyan exports to Europe and a numerical indicator based on the rise or fall in Libyan-sponsored terrorist incidents before and after each response.

The economic measure of effectiveness is designed to determine the impact each response had on the economic interests of Libya. Economic measurements are limited to EEC countries because they accounted for 75-80 percent of Libyan trade throughout the entire period covered by this thesis. In order to isolate the dependent variable (European imports from Libya) from fluctuations in the price of oil, the following formula was used:

$$\text{Imports Variable} = \frac{\text{Imports Libya US\$}}{\text{Total imports the world US\$}} \frac{\text{Barrel of oil}}{\text{Constant 1982 US\$}}$$

An analysis of variance of monthly European trade statistics before and after each response resulted in the following summary of effectiveness for each response:

Summary of Significant Findings

Country	Case Study One	Case Study Two	Case Study Three	Case Study Four
EEC	57% up, p=.0023*	58% down, p=.384	28% down, p=.001*	10% down, p=.106
Germany	29% up, p=.098	17% down, p=.058	40% down, p=.001*	8% down, p=.260
Italy	36% up, p=.106	70% down, p=.384	39% down, p=.006*	5% up, p=.745
Netherlands	342% up, p=.002*	59% up, p=.6383	50% down, p=.029*	17% down, p=.614
France	92% up, p=.073	17% down, p=.477	43% down, p=.027*	no change, p=.961
Spain	4.2% up, p=.838	23% down, p=.164	no change, p=.990	23% up, p=.129
Great Britain	77% up, p=.008*	14% down, p=.891	31% down, p=.071	57% up, p=.009*
United States	98% down, p<.001*	N/A	N/A	N/A

Case Study Three, the bombing raid on Libya was the only response to have a statistically relevant effect on Libyan exports, namely a 28 percent reduction of Libyan exports to Europe. Using only this measure of effectiveness to judge responses to state-sponsored terrorism, unilateral military responses appear to be most effective way of isolating Libya. In this study, the unilateral bombing raid on Tripoli effectively coerced reluctant European allies into supporting economic isolation of Libya by raising the threat level of Libyan-sponsored reprisals on the continent. At the same time, the raid sent a deterrent message to Libyan leadership that continued sponsorship of terrorism would be punished militarily.

The second measure of effectiveness revealed far different results. Comparing the number of alleged Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks against United States personnel or facilities for the 68 months prior to the bombing to the 68 months following, there is a 260 percent rise following the American attack. This measure of effectiveness shows the bombing raid produced negative results.

The literature on deterrence of terrorism repeatedly puts forth the idea that state-sponsored terrorism should be more easily deterred. This position is based on a state's identifiable interests which can be readily threatened by multilateral action. This point of view is addressed in this thesis by illustrating that cooperative action is rarely achieved, even in cases as vicious as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Conflicting economic interests in the international community are shown to have precluded any meaningful economic sanctions against Libya for its part in the 1988 bombing over Lockerbie.

The conclusion of this thesis critiques each response using the five initial hypotheses and also the measures of effectiveness. The costs and benefits of the strategy underlying each response are also detailed in an effort to make decision makers aware of hidden effects inherent in each response. Following this critique, the thesis concludes that a firm military and flexible diplomatic response is the most effective response to state-sponsored terrorism.

I. INTRODUCTION

Libya has been on the State Department list of state-sponsors of terrorism since the list began in 1979, presenting an opportunity to examine the evolution of American policies designed to combat state-sponsored terrorism. This thesis will examine the four distinct American responses to Libyan-sponsored terrorism that occurred between 1980 and the present: the 1982 unilateral trade embargo, the 1984 request to Europe for tough economic sanctions, the 1986 bombing raid on Libya, and the 1992 American-led United Nations sanctions on Libya. The overriding goal of each of these responses was to economically isolate Libya. This thesis will determine which of these responses was most effective in achieving this goal. The need to identify which actions were the most threatening to Libyan economic interests is derived from five working hypotheses which presuppose that the United States, Libya, and Europe, all attempt to reduce threats to their national interests. Logically, the greater the threat to one's national interests, the greater the incentive is to respond in such a way as to reduce that threat. This logic drives the following working hypotheses:

-Hypothesis One: If American national interests are threatened by Libyan terrorism, then the United States will take some unilateral action or campaign for multilateral initiatives that threaten Libyan national interests, in an attempt to deter this threatening behavior.

-Hypothesis Two: If European national interests are not threatened, then European states will not be inclined to support United States actions.

-Hypothesis Three: If European national interests are threatened, then European states will take some kind of action against Libyan national interests which may coincide with United States actions.

-Hypothesis Four: If a European country has strong economic ties with Libya, then its ability or willingness to take strong economic action will decrease.

-Hypothesis Five: If Libyan national interests are severely threatened, then Libya will decrease its sponsorship of terrorism.

These Hypotheses can be depicted schematically, as shown below in Figure 1:




Figure 1. Schematic summary of working hypotheses.

As seen in Figure 1, the United States had four possible responses to state-sponsored terrorism, excluding the ever present option of doing nothing. These options included: unilateral economic responses, unilateral political responses, unilateral military responses, and sponsorship of multilateral initiatives. Fortunately, the four American responses to a perceived threat of Libya-sponsored terrorism cover each of these categories, thus becoming convenient case studies for this thesis. The unilateral responses will be covered in the three case studies presented in Chapter III while the multilateral option, will be the focus of a single

case study presented in Chapter IV. In case study one, the United States' trade embargo of 1982, the Reagan administration opted for a unilateral economic option. In case study two, the American request for European sanctions at the 1984 London economic summit, the unilateral political card was played. The final unilateral case study, the 1986 American bombing raid on Libya, has facets of all three unilateral options with a primary emphasis on the military option. The sole multilateral case study, the United States' push for United Nations sanctions on Libya following the completion of the Lockerbie investigation in 1991, allows this multilateral response to be evaluated. With all forms of response present in the case studies, a secondary objective of the thesis is to point out the positive and negative ramifications of each choice, thus giving decision-makers a handy reference for future decisions of a similar nature.

Hypotheses Two and Three give rise to an additional secondary objective. This objective is to determine if American actions can elicit multilateral support for unilateral actions initiated by the United States. Stated more bluntly: can the United States indirectly coerce other nations into providing the desired support and if so, under what conditions? This objective is particularly important in the current world of consensus building and multilateral initiatives where at least some degree of unity must be achieved by allies with often widely divergent national interests.

The secondary objective stemming from Hypothesis Four is to determine, through each of the case studies, if dollars are thicker than blood. In other words, do American allies consistently place their own economic interests above their mutually supportive relationship with the United States? Showing this hypothesis to be true would indicate a need for an understanding of the cause and effect mechanisms at work in the previous two hypotheses which force reluctant allies to be made more supportive.

In an ideal world, Hypothesis Five would provide a way of confirming whether United States responses were focused in the correct direction. Thus, a secondary goal of this thesis will be to determine if there is a positive or negative correlation between American actions

and Libyan-sponsored terrorism. Initially, this goal was to be the primary question of the thesis but the political nature of American responses coupled with the difficulty of documenting sponsorship links to Libya for each terrorist act alleged to be Libyan-sponsored, makes a responsible academic validation of this hypothesis impossible in an unclassified thesis.

II. LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM?

The United States Department of State and each new administration have been forced to react to the American public's perception of terrorism. An analysis of this organizational evolution in response to a developing threat is beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis. One aspect of this evolution, however, is relevant and deserves further discussion. Each administration and the State Department have both placed great emphasis on the documentation of terrorism and, in particular relevance to this thesis, state sponsored terrorism.

This evolution has its roots in the Red Peril conspiracy theory advocated by Claire Sterling and many others in the late 1970's. (Sterling 1979) This school of thought felt that the Soviet Union encouraged various states in their sponsorship of terrorism, thus indirectly attacking the United States. Congress responded to the paranoia evident in this conspiracy theory in 1979 by requiring the State Department to publish an annual list of states which sponsor terrorism. (Dept. of State 1992, p. iv) Congress obviously felt that this list could achieve a number of objectives. First, it would act as an oversight tool by giving a quick score card showing who was winning this aspect of the Cold War. Second, it would give congressmen a convenient source of information with which to criticize or applaud administration policies on terrorism. Finally, it might provide some measure of deterrence to states which were identified publicly as sponsors of terrorism.

Over time, the Soviet conspiracy did not hold up to academic scrutiny but the infamous State Department blacklist remained. Libya has been on this list since the list began in 1979. Unfortunately this list did little to categorically document terrorist incidents and was of very little use in any type of academic study. In an effort to correct this situation the State Department began issuing special reports on individual states. As the Office of Counter-Terrorism began to assert itself these special reports evolved into Fact Sheets and finally White Papers. Four of these official publications will be used in this chapter to develop a

chronology of Libyan-sponsored terrorism, as Washington viewed it during this evolutionary process.

A. CHRONOLOGY OF LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM

Several aspects of these sources make them both ideal and also flawed sources for a study of United States responses to Libyan terrorism. First, there is an organizational link between the politically appointed ambassador who heads this section of the State Department and each administration. This political linkage leaves room for charges of political tinkering with the facts. An independent branch within the State Department might not be as susceptible to these charges. Second, there is a problem with supporting documentation. In many of the incidents included in the chronology below, there is no supporting source to corroborate the connection with Libya. This lack of supporting documentation is due in large part to a need to protect the sources involved in establishing the Libyan connection. Unfortunately this means that some incidents may not even be listed because the simple act of listing a connection to Libya might compromise a source. The final problem with the following chronology is a matter which affects any serious study of terrorism. Due to the secret and compartmentalized nature of terrorist organizations it is impossible to correctly identify the culprit for each terrorist incident, yet alone determine if Libya actually provided sponsorship for a particular act. This means that any study of terrorism will be working, at best, with an incomplete data set.

On the other hand, the following chronology can be very valuable if the above problems are recognized and at the same time it is realized that this data represents what the State Department and each administration believed. This is the same type of data that is sought by historians who critique the actions of a commander during a battle. It is not of supreme importance to know exactly what the enemy disposition was. Instead, it is extremely useful to identify what information was actually in the hands of the commander when certain decisions were made.

This thesis will not attempt to address the problems that are present in the chosen data set. Instead, it will assume that Washington believed in the facts presented in the following chronology. These facts then represent relevant facts that can be used to analyze why Washington acted the way it did during the period in question.

The following chronology will briefly describe each terrorist act in which the United States found a Libyan hand and identify the month and country in which the incident occurred. Two additional categories will be added which were not conveniently indicated by the State Department. Each incident that involved United States personnel or property will be indicated by a (US) next to the country in which the incident occurred. An asterisk will be used to indicate those incidents which reasonably appear to be revenge attacks for the 1986 air raid on Libya.

Chronology of Libyan Terrorism

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1980	Feb.	Libya	Tunisian and French Embassies attacked Libyan authorities took no action.
	Apr.	United Kingdom	Libyan lawyer killed in London.
		Italy	Libyan businessman killed. Assassin arrested, said victim was an enemy of Qaddafi.
		United Kingdom	Libyan anti-Qaddafi journalist killed
	May	Italy	Libyan exile killed in Rome. Shot in the head.
		West Germany	Libyan exile gunned down in Bonn.
		Italy	Libyan businessman found strangled in Rome.
		Greece	Libyan exile's throat slit in Athens.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1980	May	Italy	Libyan exile shot at in Rome but escaped injury. Arrested gunman says he was sent by Libya "to kill an enemy of the people."
	Jun.	Italy	Anti-Qaddafi exile wounded in Rome.
	Jun.	Italy	Libyan exile killed in Milan.
	Oct.	Gambia	Libyan subversion in Gambia, details unknown.
	Oct.	Chad	Libyan forces occupied Chad.
	Nov.	United Kingdom	Anti-Qaddafi Libyan student brutally murdered in London.
1981	Feb.	Italy	Libyan gunman fires on passengers in Rome airport, no fatalities. Target was anti-Qaddafi exile.
	Jun.	Sudan	Bomb explodes in front of Chadian Embassy in Khartoum.
	Jul.	United States (US)	Anti-Qaddafi Libyan student killed in Utah.
	Aug.	Libya (US)	Two Libyan SU-22's fire on US F-14's
	Oct.	Egypt	Two bombs explode in luggage being unloaded from a plane from Libya via Malta, no fatalities.
		Sudan	Attempted assassination of Chadian official, Hissein Habre, thwarted.
	Nov.	Sudan	Several bombs explode near government installations in Khartoum.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1982	No Incidents Known		
1983	Feb.	Libya	Libya warned all exiles to return home or face the anger of the Libyan people.
	Jun.	West Germany	Eight anti-Qaddafi Libyan students in West Germany complained Libyan agents were harassing them.
	Jul.	Chad	Libya invaded Chad for the second time.
	Aug.	Burkina	Libya supported coup attempt in Burkina.
1984	Feb.	Congo	Chadian dissidents threatened in Brazzaville.
		Libya	All Libyan exiles warned to return or face "the death penalty".
	Mar.	Sudan	Libyan TU-22 bombed anti-Qaddafi radio transmitter.
		United Kingdom	Four bombs exploded near homes of Libyan exiles. 25 injured. Three other bombs defused. Nine Libyan suspects arrested.
	Apr.	United Kingdom	Yvonne Fletcher killed and 11 anti-Qaddafi demonstrators wounded by gunfire from Libyan People's Bureau in London.
		Libya	British subjects arrested and held hostage in response to British closure of Libyan People's Bureau in London. Hostages eventually released unharmed.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1984	Apr	United Kingdom	Bomb in suitcase probably unloaded from a Libyan airliner exploded. 25 injured.
	May	Libya	Libya warned exiles, "suicide commandos formed to chase traitors and stray dogs wherever they are and liquidate them physically."
	Jun.	Greece	Anti-Qaddafi Libyan shopowner shot by an employee of Libyan Arab Airlines.
		Greece	Anti-Qaddafi Libyan editor of Arab newspaper killed by two men in Athens.
	Jul.	Greece	Two Libyan students beaten, strangled, gagged and shot twice in the head.
		Red Sea	Libya mined the Red Sea. 18 merchant ships damaged.
	Aug.	Belgium	Bomb exploded in office of Air Zaire
		Belgium	Bomb exploded in front of the Zairian Embassy.
		United Kingdom	Libyan awaiting trial for Apr 84 bombing was found shot in London apartment
	Sep.	Chad	Plot to assassinate President Habre foiled
		Italy	Libyan exile was found gagged and strangled
	Nov.	Egypt	Plot to assassinate Prime Minister Bakoush foiled.
1985	Feb.	Austria	Former Libyan Ambassador severely wounded in drive-by shooting.
	Mar.	Italy	Libyan jeweler murdered with a silenced pistol.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1985	Apr.	Cyprus	Libyan businessman assassinated in Nicosia.
		West Germany	Moroccan citizen killed by a Libyan gunman.
		West Germany	Anti-Qaddafi Libyan student killed by Libyan gunman.
	May	United States (US)	Libyan diplomat at the UN was declared persona non grata, and 16 Libyan officials were subpoenaed before a US grand jury for a plot to kill dissidents in several different states.
	Sep.	Tunisia	Libyan diplomat smuggled about 100 letter bombs and mails them. 2 postal workers injured.
	Oct.	Greece	Libyan merchant wounded by two gunman.
	Nov.	Egypt	Four Libyan agents arrested for plot to attack several exiles, including former PM Bakoush.
	Dec.	Malta	Hijacked Egyptian airliner may have involved support from Libya
		Italy/Austria (US)	Passports used in attacks on El Al ticket counters provided by Libya.
	Feb.	Italy	Owner of anti-Qaddafi radio station wounded in Rome by two suspected Libyan agents.
1986	Apr.	West Germany (US)	LaBelle disco bombing. Killed 2 Americans
		*Sudan (US)	US Embassy communications officer shot in Khartoum. Circumstantial evidence pointed to Libyan agents.

* Denotes that an event is generally acknowledged as a reprisals for the 1986 bombing raid.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1986	Apr.	*Lebanon (US)	Two British and an American hostage were murdered. Britain publicly linked killings to Libya.
		*Turkey (US)	Two Libyans with hand grenades arrested during attempt to attack US officers' club. Suspects admitted to getting grenades from Libyan People's Bureau.
		*North Yemen (US)	US Embassy communications officer injured in Sanaa. Attack believed instigated by Libya.
	May	*Indonesia (US)	JRA car bomb exploded outside Canadian Embassy and rocket attack launched against US and Japanese Embassies. Believed to be in retaliation for the economic summit statement on terrorism.
	Jun.	France	Libyan industrialist killed in Paris suburb by suspected Libyan agents.
	Jul.	Togo (US)	Plan to attack the US Embassy thwarted. Individuals involved confessed to having received their armaments from Libyan People's Bureau.
	Aug.	*Cyprus	Mortar and rocket attack conducted on UK base in Akrotiri. Believed to be in retaliation for UK support of April 86 raid on Libya.
	Sep.	Pakistan (US)	Pan Am jet hijacked. 21 killed, including two Americans. Strong Libyan logistic and planning support suspected.
1987	Jan.	Greece	Libyan anti-Qaddafi businessman killed by suspected Libyan assassins.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1987	Jan.	French Guyana	Government building attacked.
	Mar.	Djibouti	<i>Cafe Historil</i> bombed.
	Apr.	Cyprus	Two Libyan supported terrorists wounded British warrant officer and companion.
		Austria	Attempted assassination of a anti-Qaddafi activist and former Libyan Ambassador. Gunman had a Libyan passport and fled to the Libyan People's Bureau.
		Egypt (US)	Three US Embassy employees wounded.
	Jun.	Italy (US)	US Embassy compound attacked with crude missiles.
		Italy	Anti-Qaddafi Libyan activist killed in Rome by two agents of Libyan Revolutionary Committee.
	Oct.	Chad	<i>World Vision</i> in Moundou bombed.
	Oct.	Lebanon	Two French gendarmes assassinated
		France	UK officials intercepted a 150 ton Libyan arms shipment to the PIRA in Ireland. Earlier shipments were missed.
1988	Feb.	Senegal	Libyan terrorists arrested while smuggling a pistol, explosives and detonators.
	Apr.	*US (US)	JRA member arrested on Jersey Turnpike with three bombs in car. Likely intended for an attack on the anniversary of the air raid.
		*Spain (US)	USAF communications facility near Torrejón was bombed on the anniversary of the air raid.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1988	Apr.	*Costa Rica (US)	US-Costa Rica center attacked near the anniversary of the air raid.
		*Peru (US)	US-Peru center attacked near the anniversary of the air raid.
		*Colombia (US)	US-Colombia center attacked near the anniversary of the air raid.
		*Italy (US)	JRA car bomb in Naples killed five, including American servicewoman at the time of the anniversary of the air raid.
	May	Cyprus	Car bomb prematurely detonated near the Israeli Embassy in Nicosia.
		Sudan	Hotel in Khartoum attacked with bombs and machine guns.
	Jul.	Greece	<i>City of Poros</i> cruise ship attacked with grenades and machine guns. Nine killed and nearly 100 injured. Weapons used had been sold to Libya.
	Dec	United Kingdom (US)	Pan Am 103 bombed. 259 killed, including 189 Americans.
1989	Apr.	*Costa Rica (US)	US-Costa Rica center attacked near the anniversary of the air raid.
	Sep	Niger	UTA Flight 772 bombed, killing 171 French citizens. France concluded that Libya masterminded the operation, and issued warrants for four Libyan Government officials.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Description of Event</u>
1990	Mar.	Ethiopia	Bomb used in an unsuccessful attack on the Israeli Ambassador.
	May	Israel	Seaborne attack on Israel was thwarted. Libyans were involved in all aspects of the operation.
		Haiti (US)	Attack against the US Embassy was thwarted. Libya provided \$20,000 to the Haitian Liberation Organization.

Source: Dept. of State, 1986, 89, 91.

The inclusion of this chronology is essential to this thesis for two reasons. First, it allows decisions made throughout the period under question to be examined using the information that was available to key decision makers in each administration. By using this type of analysis the bias of American decision makers concerned with terrorism can be tracked. In the beginning of the 1980s the chronology reveals that there was a great concern for documenting Libyan terrorism occurring in the Third World. This bias is in line with the then current notion of a Soviet-sponsored ring of terror, with Libya as a major participant. As this conspiracy theory came under closer scrutiny and was slowly found wanting, the interest in Libyan sponsored terrorism begins to shift to acts committed against United States interests. To accept this analysis one must conclude that the level of terrorism reported by the State Department in Third World countries would begin to receive less emphasis from United States analysts because it no longer represented the Cold War threat so popular in the Red Peril theory. In contrast, the amount of emphasis placed on documenting direct attacks against American interests would begin to receive more attention in the reports compiled by the State Department. This evolutionary bias in the reporting and documentation of terrorist

activities can be shown in the following graph. Notice the gradual decrease in reporting of Libyan terrorist acts in other countries after 1984 and the increase in interest given to incidents against United States interests.

Libyan Sponsored Terrorist Acts




Figure 2. Libyan Sponsored Terrorist Acts

The second benefit of using data of this nature in the thesis is that it allows one to evaluate the effectiveness of American actions as seen by American decision makers. The end goal of American actions against Libya was to deter it from sponsoring terrorism (Hypothesis V). An analysis of effectiveness on Libyan sponsorship will be done in Chapter V and will not be discussed further in this section

In summary, this section has provided a chronology of Libyan sponsored terrorism, as viewed from Washington. The information is unclassified and therefore might be incomplete. It may also be affected by political pressures from each administration. Finally the data has an evolutionary bias that occurred as the Soviet conspiracy theory began to loose its hold on terrorism experts in the United States. This does not mean the chronology is not useful. It will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of American actions and to determine if Washington decision makers have learned any lessons in this extended fight against Libyan terrorism.

B. WHY NOT SYRIA OR IRAN?

The adversarial relationship between the United States and Libya over Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi's involvement in international terrorism began on October 19, 1980 when Faisal Zaqqalai, a student at Colorado State University, was shot by a hit man hired by Qaddafi. (Nossiter 1981(a), p. A7) From this point on, President Reagan took a personal interest in trying to deter Qaddafi's sponsorship of international terrorism. Libya became Washington's favorite terrorism scapegoat for a number of reasons. First, exports to the United States and Europe accounted for over 90 percent of Libyan export earnings. The United States' share of these earnings was about 40 percent during the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹ With America and its close European allies controlling most of Libya's export market, there was a firm belief that the potential for economic blackmail was extremely high. The fact that Libyan exports accounted for less than two percent of western nation imports, made it appear that an embargo on Libyan oil exports would be relatively painless. Neither Syria or Iran had this degree of dependence on exports to the west. (United Nations 1972-94)

Second, President Reagan had a deep personal animosity toward Qaddafi. "The Libyan leader, for his part, had obliged the president's fantasia with his flamboyant posture. Qaddafi might have come from the movie set of *Death Valley Days*, a photogenic and versatile villain.

¹ See Figure 4, p. 25.

perfectly cast to serve as a political ideogram in the age of Reagan." (Stork 1986, p. 6) This personal hostility, coupled with the ease which Qaddafi fit into the American image of an evil, corrupt and crazed dictator, made Libya an ideal target on which to pin the blame of terrorism.

Finally, during the 1980s, Libya was increasingly at odds with most of the international community, including other Arab states. In addition, any action against Syria and Iran would have taken place unnervingly close to the Soviet Union. This factor, combined with Syrian and Iranian influence over American hostages held during this period, made the costs associated with focusing the blame of terrorism on them too high. (Zimmermann 1987, p. 198)

III. UNILATERAL RESPONSE CASE STUDIES

As discussed above, the Reagan administration desperately wanted to be viewed as making progress in its declared war on terrorism. The case studies presented in this chapter depict three very different strategies for achieving the same goal: European support of economic sanctions against Libya. The administration felt that a unified western stance against Libya would be a sign of great progress. The strategy envisioned by policy makers when the American oil embargo began was centered on leadership by example, with high hopes that American allies in Europe would follow suit. There were optimistic predictions that Qaddafi's regime was very unstable and would be toppled from the inside if the country was forced to endure strong economic sanctions. (Nossiter 1981(b)), p. A1) In 1984, a new strategy was devised that focused on political criticism of America's allies in Europe. This strategy reached a crescendo at the 1984 London economic summit. The final unilateral strategy involved the use of military force to indirectly threaten European national interests (Hypothesis Three) by increasing the threat of Libyan terrorism on the continent. Each of these strategies are laid out as individual events in the case studies below. In each case, a specific date will be identified which marks the application of maximum pressure by the United States on its European allies. This step is critical in developing the framework for a quantitative comparative analysis of the effects derived from each response.

A. CASE STUDY ONE: THE UNILATERAL AMERICAN OIL EMBARGO

In an effort to show progress in his pledged fight against terrorism, President Reagan needed a strategy that would produce results. Having singled out Libya, for reasons discussed in Chapter II, the only remaining choice was what type of weapon to use. The first sign that the weapon of choice would be economic isolation occurred in May 1981. The administration's action, in May of 1981, also gave the first hints that economic cooperation might be hard to achieve. Surprisingly, initial resistance to this strategy did not come from

European allies but from American corporations, which had a large amount of capital invested in Libya.

On May 6, 1981, following the 1980 assassination attempt on Faysal Zaqqalai, President Reagan expelled all Libyan diplomats from their mission in Washington. The following day all American corporations with business interests and personnel in Libya were requested to "reduce their personnel and eliminate nonessential operations." (Smith 1981, p. A1) Following this meeting many of the corporations involved opted to continue their profitable relations in spite of government urging to do otherwise. It is readily apparent that this decision was made using a cost-benefit calculus in which corporate profits won out over American political interests. One executive expressed this point of view quite succinctly when he concluded: "we have nothing to do with the politics of this place, we're just trying to make a buck." (Smith 1981, p. A7) This reaction of looking out for personal interests would be repeated very soon by American allies in Europe, who also placed their own economic interests over American political concerns.

On December 10, 1981 the United States escalated its unilateral attempt to isolate Libya. Deputy Secretary of State, William P. Clark accused Libya of "broadening and accelerating its efforts to undermine neighboring states and to work against United States interests, as well as supporting international terrorism." (Weisman 1981, p. A12) In response to these terrorist activities, the administration invalidated all United States passports for travel to Libya, in order to force corporations from continuing profitable economic ties. Comments by the Deputy Secretary of State show the administration had underlying hopes that the European community would follow suit in these moves: "we would welcome their understanding and support." (Gwertzman 1981, p. A12)

The attempted assassination of Zaqqalai was not the only event used by Washington to encourage its allies to isolate Libya. In December, Alexander Haig also informed NATO ministers that death squads had been dispatched from Libya to assassinate President Reagan. Unfortunately this attempt to gain their backing was not given much credibility by the

ministers. "In their briefings for reporters, European spokesmen seemed more amused than alarmed on the reports of assassination squads sent by Libya to kill President Reagan and other American officials." (Gwertzman 1981, p. A12)

American allies were quick to move beyond expressing mere skepticism at United States allegations of mysterious hit squads. The first public declarations of European opposition to American trial balloons concerning economic boycotts were quite clear when Italian, French, British and West German diplomats stated they were against any boycott on Libyan products. (Gwertzman 1981, p. A12) Concrete European resistance to export sanctions on Libyan oil products were quick to follow when the Reagan administration announced an embargo on Libyan oil imports on March 10, 1982. Again, Washington expressed a desire for European cooperation, saying: "it would be useful if they could support us." The administration was quick to point out they had received "mild support" but "not a great deal of substantive" support from their allies in Europe. (Weisman 1982, p. A10) In fact, there was not a decrease in European imports from Libya but a significant increase. This phenomenon will be addressed separately in Chapter V, where the effectiveness of United States actions are evaluated. March 10, 1982, then marks the date on which the maximum American effort occurred in this economic strategy that relied on leadership by example.

While the United States was focused on economic isolation, "European Governments were declaring that economic sanctions were ineffective and 'never worked,' although the extent to which this idea truly motivated their reluctance was debatable. An exhaustive 1985 study had found that sanctions had been successful in 36 percent of cases overall and were yet more successful in destabilizing governments. Countries in economic distress were found to be more vulnerable to sanctions." (Hufgauer, Schott, and Elliot 1985, pp. 43, 80, 83) The administration felt that Europe was the key to making economic sanctions effective.

The United States' concern for European support was based on the premise that a decrease in American oil imports from Libya could be offset by increased European purchases. If this were to occur, the cumulative effect of a unilateral United States boycott

would hardly be felt by Qaddafi, while United States corporations would bear the brunt of the punishment burden. These worries were not unfounded. As Figure 3 shows, Libya was able to maintain a trade surplus in 1983 of \$6.19 billion, in spite of United States sanctions.




Figure 3. Libyan Trade Surplus. Source: *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* (NY: United Nations), 1970-85.

The administration's unilateral actions of 1982 were unable to force Libya into a trade deficit which the Reagan administration felt might preclude Qaddafi from continuing his sponsorship of international terrorism or even topple the regime. There was still a feeling throughout the intelligence community that the Qaddafi regime was very unstable. Throughout 1983 and 1984 intelligence reports of assassination attempts on Qaddafi by his close associates kept analysts optimistic that the unruly regime could be easily ousted from the inside by applying tough economic sanctions or using covert activity. (Gwertzman 1984, p. A6) These reports kept the administration looking for ways to gain stronger European support.

In summary, the unilateral oil embargo met with informal resistance from American businessmen in May 1981. This response to Libyan-sponsored terrorism reached its point of maximum application on March 10, 1982, when the oil embargo was officially announced. Stiff European resistance immediately followed, with no allies on the continent providing any measurable support to the American strategy of isolating Libya.

B. CASE STUDY TWO: THE LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

Following its 1982 attempt to isolate Libya, the United States was eagerly awaiting an incident which might change European attitudes on economic sanctions. The long awaited event occurred on April 17, 1984, when Yvonne Fletcher, a female police constable was shot and killed during a demonstration outside the Libyan embassy in London. The shot came from inside the embassy and Qaddafi, claiming diplomatic status for the occupants, refused to allow British police to enter the embassy or even question possible suspects inside the embassy. (Feder 1984, p. A1) President Reagan thought he had found an ally in his fight against Libya. As a result of Libyan intransigence over the embassy shooting, Margaret Thatcher announced on April 22, 1984, that Britain had broken diplomatic relations with Libya and ordered the expulsion of all occupants inside the Libyan People's Bureau.

There were calls by the opposition for the Thatcher government to take stiffer measures against Qaddafi. (Feder 1984, p. A1) The Reagan administration hoped to capitalize on this desire for stronger action and rally Europe around tougher economic sanctions. Official Washington statements said there was a hope "the United States will be more successful this time in fashioning a coordinated program of trade, economic and political sanctions at the minimum, and support for covert action against Colonel Qaddafi at the maximum." (Gwertzman 1984, p. A1)

The administration concentrated its efforts on achieving significant European sanctions against Libya on the June 1984 economic summit in London. This diplomatic full court press marks the maximum application of the political pressure called for by strategy

two. Once again, the United States' objective of tough European sanctions did not materialize. The only statements on terrorism resulting from the conference dealt with closer cooperation between police agencies, review of each country's policy on the sale of arms to states supporting terrorism, and the use of international agencies to prevent and punish terrorism. (*NYT*, Jun. 10, 1984, p. A10) Margaret Thatcher recalls the United States' pressure to impose economic measures on Libya following Yvonne Fletcher's death:

The Americans wanted us and the rest of Europe to go further still by imposing economic sanctions, in particular ending purchases of Libyan oil, 75 percent of which was bought by the Europeans. The US State Department was highly displeased and even suggested that Britain was the least helpful of their European allies - something which was quite unjust since we were already applying stiff measures against Libya as regards arms, credits and immigration and had closed down the Libyan People's Bureau. (Thatcher 1993, p. 442)

Figure 4 shows why the United States had such a strong desire to gain European cooperation. In 1980, Europe accounted for only 50 percent of total Libyan exports. By 1983, after unilateral moves by the United States, this percentage had increased to over 70 percent. After 1983, the United States had exhausted its ability to impact the Libyan economy.




Figure 4. Libyan Exports: 1972-1985. Source: *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* (NY: United Nations), 1972-85.

From 1983 on, the power to curtail Libyan access to huge sums of export capital rested almost solely in European hands. The United States was becoming extremely frustrated over its inability to gain any cooperation from Europe. Statements from American officials began to show this frustration by losing some of their diplomatic decorum. As one official stated, "The West Europeans on the whole are a bunch of chickens when it comes to Libya, and don't think Qaddafi doesn't know it." (Gwertzman 1984, p. A6) This frustration will be a key factor when trying to pin down the major objective of case study three, the 1986 bombing attack on Libya.

In summary, the administration developed a new strategy which centered on criticizing the European community at political forums for the lack of support given to economic sanctions against Libya. This strategy reached its maximum point of application during the June 1984 economic summit in London.

C. CASE STUDY THREE: THE 1986 AMERICAN BOMBING RAID ON TRIPOLI

President Reagan made a domestic pledge to combat terrorism early in his first term. Four years later, after both a unilateral economic and a political pressure strategy had been tried, he had no results to show the American public. In an effort to focus more attention on the subject, Vice-President George Bush was appointed in July 1985, as head of a commission charged with studying the problem in depth. The results of this study were published in February of 1986 and "asserted that the main supporters of radical Palestinian terrorism are Libya, Syria and Iran, and that independent agents of governments like Libya also conduct terrorist operations." (Zimmermann 1987, p. 197) This study laid the foundation for justifying the third strategy, military action designed to coerce European support.

In his study of the 1986 bombing raid, Tim Zimmermann focuses on the period between December 27, 1985 (the Rome and Vienna airport massacres) and April 15, 1986 (the bombing of Libya) and documents a "comprehensive United States strategy of coercive diplomacy." (Zimmermann 1987, p. 195) He argues this strategy of coercion was aimed just at Libya, only once alluding to a greater objective for the military operations against Libya. By examining only the coercive policy toward Libya, Zimmermann misses the overriding goal of the United States' strategy during the early 1986 period, that of forcing Europe into supporting stiffer economic and political sanctions against Libya. In discussing the January 1986 military operations in the Gulf of Sidra specifically, he writes: "White House, Pentagon and State Department sources made it clear the naval operations had three other, *more important*, purposes. . . The second was to warn United States allies that unless they dispelled their reluctance to participate in economic and political sanctions against Libya, the United States might undertake future military operations of a more punitive nature." (Zimmermann 1987, p. 204, emphasis mine)

Very few authors writing on this topic place any emphasis on the connection between the bombing raid and the subsequent American pressure on Europe for a tougher economic stance on Libya. Joe Stork is one of the few. In his 1986 article *Mad Dogs and Presidents*

he hits the nail on the head when describing the hoped-for results when the United States sent six EA-6B electronic warfare planes to Italy in January 1986 for possible operations against Libya. He correctly links this action with American attempts to "solicit European support for a total embargo of Libya." (Stork 1986, p. 8) Unfortunately, this concept is given no further elaboration by either Stork or Zimmermann and the reader is given no basis from which to judge the effectiveness of this indirect coercive strategy.

In a January 7, 1986 statement, after ordering all Americans out of Libya and curtailing all economic activity, President Reagan gave his first diplomatic hint of possible military action by declaring that Libya "constituted a threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States." In response to a question about European non-cooperation on economic sanctions, the President replied: "It may be frustrating, but we're going to go on with what we think has to be done. . . *maybe that will change some of their minds.*" (NYT, Jan. 8, 1986(a), emphasis mine)

While the administration knew Americans viewed terrorism as a grave problem - in 1985, polls showed 78 percent of the American public viewed terrorism to be one of the most serious problems facing the United States government (Zimmermann 1987, p. 210-211) - Europeans were still reluctant to view Libya as a threat. This explains why the president opened his 7 January statement with details of the Rome and Vienna airport massacres, inherently European events, making no mention of a Libyan diplomat to the United Nations and 16 other Libyan citizens who were recently subpoenaed before an American grand jury for involvement in a plot to assassinate Libyan dissidents living in the United States. (Dept. of State 1989) Washington was obviously trying to influence European public opinion, not domestic public opinion, which already viewed terrorism as a major problem.

Top presidential advisors began setting the stage for an attack on Libya in late 1985 by attempting to engineer a confrontation with Libya. National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane and CIA director William Casey came to the conclusion, after Shi'i militants hijacked a TWA flight and killed Navy diver Robert Stethem, that military plans should be

drawn up for attacks on Libya. (Stork 1986, p.7) The fact that the culprits in this incident were direct enemies of the Qaddafi regime was irrelevant.² As discussed earlier, Libya was the convenient scapegoat; it did not matter if all the evidence fit.

The president's tough policy statements of January 1986, did nothing to soften European resistance to sanctions against Libya. In Bonn, Helmut Kohl announced he "would not impose sanctions." In Spain, spokesmen said: "the government did not favor economic sanctions for political reasons." Even Great Britain said: "so far there is no change in government policy that sanctions tend not to be effective." The only French comment on the president's call for support was that "the government wanted to study the Reagan measures before taking a position." (*NYT*, Jan. 8, 1986(b), p. A8)

With European sentiments remaining opposed to sanctions, even after veiled threats of military force, the administration put into motion a chain of events designed by top military and diplomatic advisors to provoke a military clash between Libya and the United States. On January 24, 1986, the United States began exercises in the northern portion of the Gulf of Sidra. This was done in spite of Libyan insistence that the gulf was part of its territorial waters. Libya has steadfastly made a 100 mile territorial claim into the Mediterranean, contrary to the traditional 12 mile international norm. American planners were well aware of the potential results of American operations in the disputed Gulf of Sidra. In 1981, during similar operations, two Libyan SU-22's were shot down by American F-14's, with very little international repercussions. Washington was counting on a similar reaction by Libya.

These military moves placed Europe in the middle of the stage so carefully crafted by Washington. The curtain was slowly rising, forcing Europe to take some kind of action. The dilemma engineered by America was designed to be extremely difficult. On the one hand, Europe could back United States calls for harsh sanctions and risk seeing an escalation of

² Shi'i Muslims have a personal animosity toward Qaddafi stemming from 1978 when Libyan intelligence officers kidnapped and apparently killed Imam Musa al-Sadr, the leading figure in the Lebanese Shi'i community. (Dept. of State 1991)

Libyan-sponsored terrorism on the continent. On the other hand, Europe could continue to ignore American calls for cooperation and risk an American military raid. This too had the potential to cause a widespread increase in terrorism in Europe. Qaddafi helped escalate this fear by his statement to seven European ambassadors on January 8, 1986: "If they (the United States) attack me, I'll become a madman. We have to close our eyes and ears and hit indiscriminately. We are going to react with suicide squads against towns, ports, etc., wherever the threats are - while at the same time the Americans are far away. If it comes to war, we will drag Europe into it." (Davis 1990, p. 187) On January 27, 1986, Europe acted by "agreeing to ban arms sales to countries that were clearly implicated in supporting terrorism." (Lewis 1986, p. A8) Libya was not even mentioned, out of fear of possible reprisal attacks by an irate Qaddafi.

The president was not satisfied by this politically safe solution and the military coercion strategy continued, with the full knowledge that an open clash would soon occur. On March 24th, the inevitable happened. The United States sunk two Libyan patrol boats and attacked a surface to air missile sight. (Weinraub, 1986(b), p. A1) These events were not the clash designed to force Europeans into cooperation but a required military precursor to an efficient bombing raid. By encroaching into the Libyan air defense umbrella, American forces had gathered the required intelligence to plan a relatively risk free punitive raid of significant size. This raid would be the stick shown to Europe when asking for tougher economic sanctions against Libya.

The final piece of the plan was supplied on April 5, 1986, at the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin. A terrorist bomb ripped through the dance hall, killing one American soldier and wounding 60 other Americans. (Tagliabue 1986, p. A1) President Reagan claimed he had the smoking gun. In his memoirs he states: "In less than a day intelligence experts established conclusively that there had been conversations regarding the bombing *before* and *after* it occurred between Libyan diplomats in East Berlin and Qaddafi's headquarters in Tripoli. The evidence was irrefutable." (Reagan 1990, pp. 517-518.) America now had a publicized

terrorist act which it could plausibly claim as Libyan-sponsored. Thus the LaBelle bombing provided the excuse for an immediate punitive military strike against Libya. The complete evidence in the LaBelle incident has never been publicly released due to the sensitivity of the intelligence techniques involved, however, in 1990 researchers with access to East German archives confirmed Libya's direct involvement in the 1986 bombing. . . ." (Dept. of State 1990)

This strike was designed to meet the strategy of coercing European allies into supporting American efforts and was carried out almost flawlessly on April 15, 1986, with well documented results. The fact that Qaddafi escaped the bombing unscathed, appeared to the elated American public as the most glaring deficiency of the raid. As discussed earlier, the administration was correct in its assessment of American public opinion. "Two weeks after the attack 76 percent of those polled supported the attacks. . . ." (Turner 1991, p. 217)

The coercive strategy envisioned by Washington now required that a stick be wielded against Europe. This stick was the implied threat of further military raids if Europe did not cooperate with American efforts to economically isolate Libya. In his address to the nation following the attack, President Reagan voiced his frustration at the Europeans lack of response to calls for action against Qaddafi. "For years. . . he suffered no economic, or political, or military sanction. . . we tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions. . . none succeeded." (NYT, Apr. 16, 1986, p. A10) Washington ensured that Europe understood it still desired economic sanctions by "telling key allies that Mr. Reagan would seek to raise the question of a 'collective solution' to terrorism in the first session of the seven leading industrial democracies." (Boyd 1986(b), p. A1) The results of the Tokyo economic summit, less than a month after the bombing raid can be used to demonstrate how effective this stick was in garnering support from previously uncooperative allies.

Diana Johnstone aptly compared the Tokyo economic summit meeting to the Munich conference of 1938 for its similar readiness to sanction aggression against a 'faraway country about which we know nothing.' This reflected a European desire to forestall further US military attacks in *their* backyard, rather than any accord with Reagan's belligerence. (Stork 1986, p. 9)

The statement signed by the participants of the economic summit in Tokyo included Libya as a state that was clearly involved in sponsoring international terrorism. (*NYT*, May 6, 1986, p. A1) "President Reagan's top aides declared that his administration was coming away from the conference with real accomplishments, including a statement of unity against terrorism that singled out Libya in particular." (Apple 1986, p. A12) Diplomatically, it appears the bombing raid had the desired effect on Europe.

The obvious drawback of this strategy is the unpredictability of Libya's response. After the 1986 bombing, there was an immediate string of counter-reprisals against American and British interests. For instance, Libyan patrol boats fired two missiles at an American installation on Lampedusa, a small Italian island between Sicily and Tripoli, the day after the raid. (Miller 1986, p. A7) Three British hostages were murdered with notes attached to their corpses, claiming they were executed because of British assistance in the American raid. (Hijazi 1986, p. A1) Even terrorist groups normally unaffiliated with Qaddafi took action. A car bomb in Peru outside the Ambassador's residence was claimed by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement as a retaliation for the American bombing. (*NYT*, Apr. 22, 1986, p. A22) Terrorist attacks that occurred later, with no outright claim of revenge for the bombing raid, are much harder to identify as being connected to the American strategy. This unknown factor remains one of the big risks of pursuing a coercive strategy of this sort.

A second drawback of this strategy is the fact that Europeans recognized the implied threat and strongly voiced their displeasure over American actions. Prime Minister Craxi said "the American attack could cause a further explosion of fanaticism and extremism." (Dionne 1986, p. A16) There were also anti-American demonstrations in many European capitals following the raid. In general, the view of European leaders was critical because they understood the possible increase of terrorism that might flame up on their territory as a result of the American raid.

In summary, case study three shows the final unilateral American strategy involved the use of military force to coerce European support for sanctions against Libya. This subtle

strategy of coercion indirectly threatened the national interests of European allies (Hypothesis Three). Libyan-sponsored terrorist reprisals were the threat Washington hoped Europe would fear enough to begin support of American efforts to isolate Libya economically. The obvious point of maximum pressure is the April 1986 bombing raid itself. The following chapter will investigate the only American response that focused on multilateral initiatives to combat Libyan terrorism.

IV. MULTILATERAL RESPONSE CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN REACTION TO LOCKERBIE

This chapter will investigate the drastically different American response to the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The immediate American reaction centered around the desire for a punitive military strike similar to the 1986 bombing raid. The urge to fall back on a validated response was definitely present, in spite of this desire, no punitive military strike was launched. The long term reaction will also be analyzed to determine what caused Washington to finally embark on a multilateral approach. Finally, other American national interests will be examined to determine if there were new national interests, not present in 1986, which mitigated against a punitive military strike at Libya.

A. THE IMMEDIATE AMERICAN REACTION

On December 22, 1988, Pan Am 103, a 747 en route from London to New York, exploded in mid air over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 238 passengers on board. A pro-Iranian group called the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution claimed responsibility for the disaster. This claim meshed well with a 1986 report by then Vice President George Bush, which identified Libya, Iran, and Syria as the major sponsors of radical Palestinian terrorism. However, the United States immediately let it be known "the feeling now is that they (Guardians of the Islam Revolution) weren't involved in the blast, and we're focusing attention on other groups." (Sciolino 1988, p. A3) These other groups included the Syrian-sponsored Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Fatah Revolutionary Council, based in Tripoli. The United States was obviously eager to identify the culprit but it immediately shifted the blame from a group who had confessed, to other more politically attractive terrorist groups. All this was done while the evidence was still scattered over thousands of square miles of Scottish countryside.

In spite of this lack of evidence, President-elect Bush very quickly made the committing statement that the United States would "punish firmly and decisively those found

responsible for the attack." (Dowd 1988, p. A10) President Reagan went even further by saying: "the pledge we make to seek out the truth and punish the guilty is a sacred one." (Dowd 1988, p. A3) If retaliatory measures were to be taken, President Reagan and President-elect Bush were presented with a difficult problem of assigning blame. As Schelling stresses in his classic study on military influence, retaliation must be prompt and linked to the undesired act in order to be fully effective.³ This axiom was followed by the Reagan administration in the 1986 reprisal but in 1988, with little or no physical evidence immediately available, the decision on whom to retaliate could not be made in a prompt manner. From these initial statements, it is safe to conclude that both Bush and Reagan felt a political need to respond with strong action but lack of immediate evidence made a punitive bombing similar to 1986 difficult to justify.

The immediate pressure for military action of this sort was extremely strong and stemmed from two political concerns. The first concern was for the domestic image of the president. A vile and repulsive attack on innocent Americans had occurred and the president had to be seen as heeding public calls for some kind of response. For a country like the United States, with a decisive military edge over the suspected culprits, military reprisals were extremely attractive. The international community, including leaders close to the president, expressed a much different view on retaliation. Margaret Thatcher immediately went public with her belief that "No revenge should be taken. . . I do not think an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth is ever valid." (Rule 1988, p. A1) Statements such as this provided an important counter-balance to domestic public opinion, offering some restraint to the otherwise attractive option of a reprisal raid.

³ This necessity for a prompt and linked response is discussed by Schelling when he considers the US reprisal for harassment of the destroyer *Turner Joy*, in which the US used 64 aircraft to attack naval installations in North Vietnam. "Had the United States waited a week to mount the attack, some of the connection would have been dissipated." (Schelling 1966, p. 145)

The second issue which weighed in favor of a military reprisal was discussed during the earlier examination of American efforts to isolate Libya between 1980 and 1986. It was shown that unilateral economic sanctions or political requests for multilateral support of strong sanctions against Libya (forms of reprisal) were virtually ignored by Europe. In addition, at the time of the Pan Am incident, the United States had no trade or diplomatic relations with Libya so the peaceful alternatives of cutting these relations were not even possible options. The only two options were a political request for multilateral sanctions or a punitive military raid.

The military option must have been immensely attractive, considering Washington's past failures when requesting multilateral sanctions and the domestic support for a raid similar to the 1986 attack. The administration weighed these pressures and in the short term it appears that the idea of military action was still the preferred choice in early January 1989. On January 4, 1989, two American F-14's shot down two Libyan Mig 23's over the Gulf of Sidra. (Pear 1989, p. A1) This event was almost an exact duplication of the January 1986 encounter which was previously shown to have been a military prerequisite to the April 1986 reprisal attack on Libya. By encroaching into Libyan claimed airspace, vital intelligence on its air defense system was collected. The United States knew, as it had in early 1986, that any American moves into the Gulf of Sidra would evoke a strong response by Libyan air defense systems. Following so shortly after the Lockerbie incident, with Libyan pilots well aware of the potential for a reprisal attack, any American incursion into the Gulf of Sidra was surely designed to result in a military confrontation. Washington was clearly setting in motion a military reprisal, while it anxiously awaited definitive proof of Libyan involvement.

By February, the idea of an immediate military reprisal seems to have been shelved. Lack of concrete evidence and the strong international outrage experienced after the 1986 bombing raid made this option appear less and less attractive as time passed and tempers cooled. By February 7, 1989, officials had begun to concentrate the investigation on possible Syrian assistance given to the PFLP-GC and its ties to Iran. One official said "there is no

question that there is some organizational connection between the PFLP-GC and factions of the Iranian Government." (Wines 1989, p. A10) This shift in the investigation from Libya as the prime suspect, to a Syrian-Iranian backed PFLP-GC as the primary suspect coincides with the end of American rhetoric for an immediate reprisal. The fact that Libya, the convenient scapegoat for Middle Eastern terrorism was no longer the primary suspect caused Washington to slow down, cool its rhetoric and look at the ramifications of who it eventually pinned the blame on.

February then marks the end of the immediate American reaction to the downing of Pan Am 103. This immediate reaction centered around a strong desire to conduct a prompt military reprisal against Libya, on which the administration hoped it could quickly pin the blame. Intense domestic pressure and past frustrations with multinational cooperation coupled to make a military reprisal appear as the best immediate solution. As the situation developed and no clear culprit could be established, prudent and careful investigation into who was responsible appears to have overcome the instinctive American urge to take military action. The next section will discuss the reasons the administration finally decided to pursue a multilateral approach and ended up returning to Libya as the sole culprit for the Lockerbie bombing.

B. THE LONG TERM AMERICAN REACTION

After the immediate urge to retaliate had cooled off, America dedicated its vast resources to finding the culprits of the Pan Am bombing. Any reaction would have to await the results of this massive investigation. That the United States was conducting the investigation jointly with the United Kingdom and working closely with other European security and intelligence services, (Lord Advocate's Announcement 1991, p. 4) would lead one to believe that unilateral action at the conclusion of the investigation might prove difficult.

The results of the investigation were made public, both in Washington and London, on November 14, 1991. These bilateral statements placed the blame squarely on the

shoulders of two Libyan nationals, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Magrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, both of whom were alleged to be members of the Libyan Intelligence Service. In addition, a demand was made to Libya for the surrender of these men for trial. The reports were very specific in detailing both men's involvement in the bombing and the assistance they obtained from the Libyan Intelligence Service. (Lord Advocate's Announcement 1991)

With the investigation complete and the government of Libya specifically indicted by both the United Kingdom and the United States, there was ample justification for a military reprisal. Several factors mitigated against the United States taking a unilateral military action similar in scope to the 1986 bombing raid. First, the magnitude and indiscriminate nature of the Lockerbie bombing in comparison to the La Belle bombing (271 dead versus 2 dead), made the United States believe that international outrage would aid in obtaining multilateral cooperation. With the evidence obtained from the investigation, Washington was extremely optimistic it could convince the world to support harsh economic sanctions against Libya. Second, the United States felt that it had already committed to a multilateral solution by conducting a joint investigation with Britain and accepting the assistance offered by other nations during the investigation. By proceeding in this multilateral manner, the United States risked alienating those who had cooperated in the investigation if it took the punishment of Libya into its own hands. Third, almost three years had passed since the bombing over Lockerbie. As a result, domestic pressure for military revenge had somewhat cooled. There were certainly many groups who still believed a military reprisal was warranted but on the whole, the attention of the American public had moved on to newer, more immediate concerns.⁴ This three year cooling off period did not mean the United States ruled out a

⁴ The only two special interest groups which expressed a continued vocal interest in the results of the investigation were the families of the victims and Israeli intelligence. Both of these groups expressed displeasure at administration findings that absolved Syria of any participation in the bombing. Neither of these groups, each very deeply affected by terrorism, raised the cry for a punitive military raid. (Haberman 1991, p. A14 and Johnston 1991, p. A14).

military option, it just lessened the domestic political pressure on the White House for military action. Fourth, the previously discussed outrage which was expressed by the international community after the 1986 raid must have had an effect on the administration. The United Nations General Assembly even adopted a resolution condemning the United States raid on Tripoli, as a violation of international law. (*NYT*, Nov. 21, 1986) This, coupled with the well publicized lack of logistic support by NATO allies and their negative public reaction following the raid, must have given key decision makers good reason to shy away from a similar raid three years after the Lockerbie bombing.

Finally, there was the unknown quantity of how Qaddafi and other Arab radicals would react. After the 1986 bombing, there was an immediate string of counter-reprisals against American and British interests. These counter-reprisals were discussed as one of the drawbacks of a coercive strategy in Chapter III. The State Department reiterated the danger of such counter-reprisals in its White Paper on Libyan sponsored terrorism. The State Department sources used to develop the chronology in Chapter II identified thirteen revenge attacks occurring shortly after or on subsequent anniversaries of the bombing raid. (Dept. of State 1986, 89, 91) Surely then, the administration understood the danger of potential deadly counter-reprisals and took this into consideration.

With all these reasons not to conduct a reprisal attack, the United States officially did not rule out this option. Instead, Washington elected to keep the military option open, holding it as a threat while trying to rally the international community behind some form of multilateral sanctions. This threat did have the credibility of the 1986 raid to back it up. Headlines such as: "U.S. Will Try Diplomatic Action Before a Military Strike on Libya," (Wines 1991, p. L3) surely had an effect on delegates to the United Nations. This stick also appeared to have an effect on Europe, which appeared prepared to support strong economic sanctions, unlike its stance throughout the 1980-86 period. "European officials in Brussels . . . indicated a strong likelihood that severe economic sanctions would be imposed," if Libya did not hand over the men accused of bombing Pan Am 103. (Ibrahim 1991, p. A5)

By December 1991, the response had moved to the United Nations, where the United States, Great Britain, and France⁵ submitted a resolution aimed at isolating Libya economically. The problems this resolution encountered at the United Nations level are innumerable. The conflicting national interests of every member country began to come into play. Even an event as indiscriminate and vicious as the downing of flight 103 did not result in the United Nations agreeing on stiff economic sanctions, once the culprit was identified. The reality of the multilateral sanctions imposed on Libya by this utopian body were quite a different story. The best that could be resolved was bans on all international flights in and out of Libya, the sale of arms, commercial planes and spare parts, and the delivery of any related services. (Lewis, 1992, p. A1)

The United States missed a critical detail in appraising the magnitude of the Lockerbie bombing. Certainly Flight 103 gained prominence in both Great Britain and the United States' national psyche. Other non-European nations, which represent a majority in the United Nations, did not attach such significance to the downing of Pan Am Flight 103. Evidence of this phenomenon could be seen by polling both French and American residents on their knowledge of UTA Flight 772's significance. Undoubtedly, the French would place more significance on this alleged Libyan bombing which killed 171 than would the average American. After all, the majority of the dead bodies were French, just as in the Lockerbie disaster, the majority of the bodies were American and British. Once again, it appears the United States had difficulty convincing others that Libya represented a threat to their national security (Hypothesis Three).

This section has documented the long term American reaction to the Libyan-sponsored bombing of the Pan Am jumbo jet over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 22, 1988. Unlike the reaction to the La Belle bombing in December 1985, the United States

⁵ In October 1991, the French issued warrants for four Libyan officials for their role in a 1989 commercial airline bombing similar to the Lockerbie incident which killed 171. The French concluded that they too had been victims of a Qaddafi sponsored terrorist attack. (Dept. of State, 1991)

opted to address the issue in the international arena. This response culminated in a United Nations resolution to isolate Libya by creating a worldwide embargo on air travel, arms shipments, and aviation spare parts and services. This resolution went into effect on April 15, 1992⁶ and this date marks the maximum application of pressure under a multilateral strategy. The next section will define American national interests at this point in time to determine if counter-terrorism efforts ranked at the top of the list. During 1986, it was shown that the administration and the American public viewed terrorism as one of the greatest challenges to foreign policy. If this threat to national interests (Hypothesis One) had diminished by 1988, this could explain why the urge to conduct a military raid on Libya was not immediately acted upon.

C. OTHER AMERICAN INTERESTS

Hypothesis One predicted that as the terrorist attacks by Libya increased in scope, the American response would become stronger. This section will determine why this did not occur after Lockerbie, the most devastating Libyan attack. The only logical explanation, fitting the hypotheses set out in Chapter I, is that by carrying out such an escalatory reprisal, other more important national interests would be harmed or threatened. It cannot be doubted that terrorism incidents like Pan Am 103 represent a threat to the national security of the United States. This threat however, must be placed into perspective. Americans killed by political violence in 1988 totaled 198 worldwide. According to State Department figures, the Pan Am 103 downing accounted for 189 of these deaths, leaving only nine other fatalities attributed to terrorism. (Dept. of State 1988) During 1992, there were close to twenty

⁶ For a current assessment on the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions against Libya, see: Edward T. Pound with Jihan El-Tahri, "Sanctions: The Pluses and Minuses. World Leaders Love Them. But do they Work?" in *U.S. News and World Report* (October 31, 1994). In this excellent special report, the authors document why United Nations sanctions have done little to moderate the country's outlaw behavior. The problems identified are indicative of most multilateral sanctions and center on intentional loopholes, lax enforcement, and personal greed.

thousand deaths caused by drunk drivers in the United States (U. S. Senate 1993). These figures allude to the fact that, while terrorism may be a very sensational and emotional issue, the actual threat to national security from state-sponsored terrorism is relatively small.

In 1988, three more far reaching national security objectives were present that were absent in 1986. First, Yasir Arafat had recently renounced terrorism and opened talks with the United States. Second, the United States had intelligence that Libya was well along in construction of a chemical/biological weapons plant in Rabat. Third, there was a growing concern over American hostages held in the Middle East. These three issues played a critical role in the United States' decision to carefully investigate the Lockerbie incident and not carry out an emotionally cathartic military raid against the most politically convenient suspect.

1. The Middle East Peace Process

The November 1988 declaration by the Palestinian National Congress, which recognized Israel and accepted United Nations Security Resolution 242, marked a major breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. By December, the United States and Yasir Arafat were negotiating through Swedish intermediaries for another dramatic step forward. These negotiations began to produce significant results on December 14, 1988, when Arafat accepted "the right of all parties in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security." With redoubled emphasis, he added "I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism." Secretary of State Schultz immediately responded that the United States was prepared to open a "substantive dialogue with PLO representatives." (Gowers and Walker 1992, p. 300)

The fact that Pan Am Flight 103 exploded just eight days after this historic announcement put both Washington and the PLO in a precarious situation. Arafat reacted to the situation by condemning the downing of the plane and offering to assist with any inquiries on the United States behalf. (Rule, 1989, p. A3) President Bush also had to take the

Middle East peace process into account when dealing with the Lockerbie incident. The president could have laid the blame for Pan Am 103 on Syria, Libya or Iran. As early as February of 1989, "State Department officials said that Syrian President, Hafez al-Assad, has curtailed his support for terrorism in an effort to improve relations with the United States." (Wines 1989, p. A10)

By this time, Washington appeared to be leaning away from blaming Syria, a critical Middle East peace participant. This was being done in spite of strong evidence that Syria was a major suspect in the most spectacular terrorist action ever taken against the United States. At this point in the investigation, there was good reason to suspect Syria but the United States was publicly and without concrete physical evidence steering the blame to its favorite terrorism scapegoat, Libya. The evidence for Syrian involvement in the Lockerbie bombing was staggering. In April, West German officials, acting on a tip from a Jordanian informant, Marwen Khreeshat, accounted for four of five bombs cleverly disguised in innocent looking electronic equipment. (Emerson and Duffy 1990, p. 86) According to Khreeshat, the maker of the bombs, they were made for Ahmed Jibril, leader of the Syrian backed PFLP-GC. One of the four bombs discovered was concealed in a Toshiba Model Bombeat, almost an exact replica of the type used in the Lockerbie bombing. (Emerson and Duffy 1990, p. 86) According to Khreeshat, he had made five bombs but only four had been recovered, leaving one unaccounted for. Emerson and Duffy feel this fifth bomb was probably the one that caused the Lockerbie explosion. In fact, everything Emerson and Duffy uncovered in their painstaking account of the Lockerbie investigation pointed to a strong Syrian, not Libyan connection.

The American diplomatic treatment of Syria at this critical point in the peace process is in marked contrast to their diplomatic treatment of Libya after the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was fingered for the Vienna and Rome airport bombings in 1985. In April, the United States quietly asked President Assad to curtail any terrorist activity by the PFLP-GC and did not request he expel them from Syria, as was requested of Libya with the ANO, after the

Rome and Vienna airport bombings. (Sciolino 1989, p. A18) This difference in treatment toward Syria and Libya is inexplicable if the number of American fatalities from each of the incidents is the judgement criteria. In the Rome and Vienna bombings, only five Americans were killed, (Wienraub, 1986(b), p. A1) while 189 Americans had died in the Lockerbie bombing. In all actuality, the Middle East peace process was taking precedence over the solemn vows to punish the guilty party of the Pan Am 103 bombing. This is understandable when the national security ramifications of terrorism are weighed against those of a lasting Middle East peace.

2. Libyan Chemical Weapons

The second issue of national security importance in 1988, was an American desire to stop other countries from providing the technology required to proliferate chemical weapons of mass destruction. The United States was facing the frightening prospect of chemical and possibly biological technology spreading to Libya, with assistance from European companies, especially West Germany.

This facilitation of technology flow to a country like Libya was seen as a grave danger to American national security. The relative ease with which reliable chemical or biological weapons can be manufactured compared to nuclear weapons is staggering. This ease of technology access, coupled with the potential effects of these weapons, caused considerable attention to be focused on the issue in the late 1980s. The following chart is indicative of the theoretical calculations that came into vogue during this period and explains why such attention was drawn to Libya's chemical/biological facility under construction in Rabat. Experts firmly believed Libya would have the large scale chemical and biological capability to produce these weapons of mass destruction once the Rabat plant was complete.

Comparison of Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons

Weapon	10 tons Bio. Agent	15 tons Chem. Agent	1 Megaton Bomb
Optimal Area	100,000 km2	600 km2	300 km2
Onset of Symptoms	Days	Minutes	Instantaneous
Lethality	50% Morbidity, 25% Dead	50% Dead	90% Dead

Figure 5. Comparison of Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons.

Source: Office of Technology Assessment, *Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction* 1990.

In 1988, in an attempt to slow the proliferation of technology necessary to build the poor man's weapon of mass destruction, "the United States became very assertive regarding chemical weapons. L. Paul Bremer III, Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, appeared before a congressional committee and provided a comprehensive statement regarding United States interest in high technology terrorism." (Wiegele 1992, p. 25) Also in 1988, Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, said: "we have called on all countries to refrain from supplying Libya with any assistance in developing a chemical weapons capability." (Wiegele 1992, p. 28) These statements by administration officials leave no doubt the United States felt that stopping chemical weapons proliferation was quickly becoming a higher priority than terrorism. The final evidence of terrorism's fall down the ladder of national security threats is the State Departments January 1989 Fact Sheet concerning Libyan terrorism. For the first time, Libya's chemical weapons facilities received recognition. In fact, a full page spread was dedicated to Libya's chemical weapons facilities in a publication dedicated to counter-terrorism. (Dept. of State 1989, p. 6) This shows an increasing bureaucratic emphasis on the chemical weapons threat over the terrorism threat.

No specific allegations were made against European allies until December 31, 1988, just ten days after Lockerbie. The administration specifically chose this time to make

intelligence information public that named West German firms in the transfer of critical chemical weapons technology to Libya. The administration "announced it had identified the West German firm Imhausen-Chemie as the major player in the supply effort." (Wiegele 1992, p. 38) Knowing that there would be worldwide outrage over the Lockerbie bombing and already shifting the blame toward Libya, the United States hoped that multilateral pressure would build on West Germany to curtail its domestic chemical industries from providing assistance to Libya.

At the urging of the United States, the Paris Chemical Weapons Conference was held in early 1989. This move marked the first American step in the direction of multilateral initiatives against Libya. The military solution of striking the plant at Rabat was full of potential pitfalls. The plant was guarded by a very robust system of surface to air missiles, many of the key facilities were underground or placed close to innocent production facilities, and the risk of inadvertent chemical releases, all presented extreme hazards to military planners. Using the Pan Am incident as justification for a bombing of the Rabat plant would probably have been grudgingly accepted by the international community but the possible condemnation that would occur if the raid generated toxic releases, pushed America toward the arena of multilateral solutions.

Had the United States conducted a punitive military reprisal against Libya, the general multilateral progress in 1989 may not have been so forthcoming. In September of 1989, the leaders of the world's major chemical industries issued a statement expressing "their willingness to work actively with governments to achieve a global ban on chemical weapons." (Wiegele 1992, p. 67) In addition, West Germany began prosecution against Dr Jurgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, the director of Imhausen-Chemie for his role in organizing the export of chemical weapons technology to Libya. (Wiegele 1992, p. 118) Despite these promising multilateral statements and the West German prosecution of the main technology supplier, Libya now has a functioning chemical weapons plant in Rabat.

3. American Hostages Held in the Middle East

As discussed earlier, Washington immediately cleared the Iranian-sponsored Guardians of the Islamic Revolution from suspicion in the Lockerbie bombing. This can only be explained by administration concerns for hostages held by pro-Iranian militants. Iran had vowed to take revenge against the United States for the *USS Vincennes'* downing of an Iranian airliner. The only explanation for excusing a confessed suspect with a publicly declared motive of revenge was the president's concern for American hostages. Administration officials exonerated Iranian terrorists groups on December 27, 1988, just nine days after the Lockerbie incident. (Sciolino 1988, p. A11) At this point in the investigation, no evidence had as yet been produced to show that Pan Am Flight 103 had in fact been torn apart by a bomb. Sketchy evidence indicating a bomb caused the crash was not even released until December 28, 1988. (Rule 1988, p. A3) This premature absolution of Iranian complicity indicates the administration was treating Iran with kid gloves due to its influence over groups which held American hostages. The following chart will help explain why the president felt compelled to take this conciliatory approach toward Iran in 1988 when it took the opposite approach with Libya in 1986 following the LaBelle bombing.

Summary of Key American Hostages Held By Middle East Extremists

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date Abducted</u>	<u>Abductors</u>	<u>1986 Status</u>	<u>1988 Status</u>
Peter Kilburn	11/30/84	Arab Rev Cell	Body found 4/17/86	N/A
Lawrence Jenco	1/8/85	Islamic Jihad	Hostage	Released
Terry Anderson	3/16/85	Islamic Jihad	Hostage	Hostage
David Jacobsen	5/28/85	Islamic Jihad	Hostage	Released
Thomas Sutherland	6/9/85	Islamic Jihad	Hostage	Hostage

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date Abducted</u>	<u>Abductors</u>	<u>1986 Status</u>	<u>1988 Status</u>
Frank Reed	9/9/86	Arab Rev. Cells	N/A	Hostage
Joseph Cicippio	9/12/86	Rev. Justice Organization	N/A	Hostage
Edward Tracy	10/21/86	Rev. Justice Organization	N/A	Hostage
Robert Polhill	1/24/87	Islamic Jihad	N/A	Hostage
Alann Steen	1/24/87	Islamic Jihad	N/A	Hostage
Jesse Turner	1/24/87	Islamic Jihad	N/A	Hostage
William Higgins	2/17/88	Hezbollah	N/A	Hostage

Source: Antokol 1990, pp. 181-188.

The above table brings into focus concerns which weighed heavily on the administration in 1988. At this time there were eight American hostages being held by various Shi'i terrorist groups. In 1986, during the Libyan raid, only one American was being held by an Arab affiliated terrorist group and he was found dead two days after the raid on Libya. 1988 was an election year and the president could not afford to take any unnecessary risks with respect to the hostages. The risk which is most apparent can be seen by the inclusion of Peter Kilburn who was killed in retaliation for the American bombing raid. In addition, two British citizens were both executed because Margaret Thatcher gave approval to launch F-111's from bases in the United Kingdom. Notes making the connection between the raid and the execution of these hostages were found pinned on their bodies when they were recovered. (Hijazi 1986, p. A1) The potential impact on the presidential election of a single hostage being executed as a result of a presidential decision to conduct a raid on either Libya, Iran or Syria was a price the administration was not willing to gamble with.

The second factor that may not be readily apparent is the fact that the groups holding these hostages in 1988 were predominately Shi'i Muslim, the only exception being the group holding Frank Reed. As discussed earlier, these groups had a great hatred for Qaddafi so a raid on Libya in 1988 would have only risked the life of one hostage. A raid on Iran would have put the lives of eight American citizens at risk. This fact goes a long way in explaining why the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, a splinter group of Islamic Jihad were so quickly proclaimed innocent of any connection with the Pan Am bombing.

This section has shown that Washington placed other national security objectives above the emotional and instinctive desire to retaliate militarily against Libya. These national security goals included a desire to gain multilateral cooperation in the fight against chemical weapons proliferation, a need to keep any controversial action from derailing the delicate Middle Peace talks, and the safety of American hostages. These three national security objectives helped set the course for America's long term reaction to the Lockerbie bombing. They also support Hypothesis One, by showing that America addressed threats to its national security in a prioritized manner and by 1988, terrorism had fallen, at a minimum, below the combined importance of the three national security interests discussed above.

V. EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS

A. EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS ON EUROPEAN IMPORTS FROM LIBYA

Throughout this period the major goal of the United States' Libyan policy was to isolate Libya economically, not necessarily to punish Libya directly through the use of military force. Prior to the 1986 bombing raid President Reagan made it clear that military force was not his first choice when he promised there would be no attack if Europe "imposed stringent economic sanctions." (Boyd 1986(a), p. A10)

Since the goal of Washington was that of securing European economic cooperation in isolating Libya, I use allied imports from Libya as the measure of effectiveness for United States actions. This measure was calculated by dividing the countries' imports from Libya by their total imports. This percentage figure was chosen over a straight dollar measure to take into account any fluctuations in economic conditions in the countries examined, such as a severe economic downswing. The initial problem encountered in using this measure was the fluctuation in the price of oil. As Figure 6 shows, using the dependent variable (country imports from Libya/Total country imports), it appears that the 1986 bombing raid had a significant deterrent effect on European willingness to export from Libya. In fact, an analysis of variance revealed the effect (using the 12 month mean before the attack and the 12 month mean after the attack) to be highly significant (ie: $p < .0001$). Unfortunately, close examination of Figure 6 reveals that the drop in imports began three months prior to the March attack. This happens to coincide with the Gulf of Sidra incident in January 1986 but another more significant event occurred that caused this distortion.




Figure 6. EEC Imports from Libya/Total EEC Imports.
Source: *Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)*. (France: OECD), 1978-1994

Further research revealed the price of oil decreased by 50% between 1985 and 1986! Since oil accounted for 90 to 98 percent of European imports from Libya, it is critical price fluctuations be taken into account. In order to isolate the dependent variable (imports from Libya) from fluctuations in the price of oil, the following formula was used:

$$\text{Imports Variable} = \frac{\text{Imports Libya US\$}}{\text{Total imports the world US\$}} \times \frac{\text{Barrel of oil Constant 1982 US\$}}{\text{Constant 1982 US\$}}$$

Figure 8 represents the result using the above formula for the twelve members of the EEC. Note that the drop in imports now coincides with the March 1986 bombing. The following table gives the cost per barrel of oil used in the above calculations.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cost in constant 1982 \$'s</u>
1978	12.82
1979	15.9
1980	24.04
1981	32.42
1982	28.52
1983	25.85
1984	24.96
1985	23.34
1986	12.49
1987	14.98
1988	11.77
1989	14.14
1990	17.22
1991	14.20
1992	13.63

Figure 7. Changes in Price of Oil.

Source: *Basic Petroleum Data Book*, American Petroleum Institute. (Washington, D.C. 1994).

EEC Imports from Libya/Total EEC Import Corrected for oil price fluctuations




Figure 8. EEC Imports from Libya/Total EEC Imports, corrected for oil price fluctuations.
Sources: American Petroleum Institute, *Basic Petroleum Data Book*. Washington D.C. 1994 and *Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)*. (France: OECD).

The same calculations were made for the following countries: France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, United States, and Great Britain. The resulting graphs for each of the individual countries are included in Appendix A. The significant findings resulting from these calculations are given in Figure 9. In this table, each case study is assigned a corresponding period which covers the 12 months prior and the 12 months following the date of maximum application, as follows:

<u>Period</u>	<u>Months Covered</u>	<u>Case Study</u>
Period 1	Mar 81 - Mar 83	United States Trade Embargo
Period 2	Jun 83 - Jun 85	US request for European sanctions following death of Yvonne Fletcher
Period 3	Apr 85 - Apr 87	US bombing raid
Period 4	Mar 91 - Mar 93	UN Embargo

Figure 9 shows the percent rise and drop in mean imports, corrected for oil price fluctuations, for the 12 months following compared to the 12 months prior and the probability of whether that drop (or rise) is due to the indicated event or chance. P-values of less than 0.05 are considered significant and are marked by an asterisk. Case studies with a preponderance of P-values less than 0.1 indicate that the American strategy identified is almost certain to have caused the change in the dependent variable, unless there are other variables not accounted for.

Summary of Significant Findings

Country	Case Study One	Case Study Two	Case Study Three	Case Study Four
EEC	57% up, $p=.0023^*$	5.8% down, $p=.384$	28% down, $p=.001^*$	10% down, $p=.106$
Germany	29% up, $p=.098$	17% down, $p=.058$	40% down, $p=.001^*$	8% down, $p=.260$
Italy	36% up, $p=.106$	7.0% down, $p=.384$	39% down, $p=.006^*$	5% up, $p=.745$
Netherlands	342% up, $p=.002^*$	5.9% up, $p=.6383$	50% down, $p=.029^*$	17% down, $p=.614$
France	92% up, $p=.073$	17% down, $p=.477$	43% down, $p=.027^*$	no change, $p=.961$
Spain	4.2% up, $p=.838$	23% down, $p=.164$	no change, $p=.990$	23% up, $p=.129$
Great Britain	77% up, $p=.008^*$	1.4% down, $p=.891$	31% down, $p=.071$	57% up, $p=.009^*$
United States	98% down, $p=.0002^*$	N/A	N/A	N/A

Figure 9. Summary of Significant Findings.

These results are surprising because so few people understand the effect that each American action generated. Key decision makers had no idea that United States businessmen would bear the lion's share of the punishment when the United States declared an oil embargo on Libya. These same decision makers may have been unaware that the bombing raid actually did cause Europe to significantly reduce imports from Libya.

These results coincide with common sense analysis. Each case study and the corresponding result on European imports from Libya will be discussed, starting with case study one, the unilateral American embargo begun in March of 1982. This embargo is indicated by the first vertical line on the European import graphs shown above. When the United States quit buying Libyan exports in 1982 there is, as one would expect, a sharp rise (57 percent) in the amount of oil imported by the EEC. With a P-value of .0023, this result is very unlikely to be due to chance. Instead, it represents what American decision makers feared most when the move was made to begin a unilateral embargo: Europe would not follow suit. In fact, not a single European country examined followed the United States' lead.

Instead, they preferred to place their own economic interests ahead of America's political objectives, just like American businessmen did in 1981 when requested to voluntarily cut their profitable ties with Libya. For this reason, when the supply of oil available from Libya increased, due to the American embargo, Europeans moved in and took advantage. Obviously, the United States' embargo did not have the desired effect on American allies in Europe. In fact, the resulting effect was the opposite of that intended.

The second case study, an American call for stiff sanctions on Libya at the London economic conference following the death of Yvonne Fletcher, was clearly ignored by Europe. This event is represented by the second vertical line on the European import graphs shown above. Not a single country examined showed a significant change in purchases of Libyan exports following this diplomatic full court press. The results make it clear that a strategy of political requests and criticism does little to convince other nations to drastically alter their trade relations with countries believed to be sponsoring terrorism. Even outlandish claims of hit squads dispatched to assassinate President Reagan were not enough to make Europeans overlook their own economic interests.

The final unilateral effort by the United States to make Europeans reduce their purchases of Libyan oil, case study three, had far more effective results. Every country examined, with the exception of Spain, had a significant and immediate drop in imports of Libyan oil following the American bombing raid. Spain appears to be an exception but careful examination of the Spanish import graph, shown in Figure 10 below, reveals that Spain did have a drastic reduction in October of 1986, six months following the raid.

This delay can be explained by the degree of Spanish dependence on Libyan oil, compared to the other countries examined. Trade statistics shows that in 1985, Libya accounted for approximately 3.74 percent of Spain's foreign trade. This figure is 290 percent greater than the EEC average for 1985. (See Appendix B) The six month delay then represents a period in which Spain was trying to locate alternative sources of oil. Other

Spanish imports/Total imports

corrected for oil price fluctuations




Figure 10. Spanish Imports/Total Imports, corrected for oil price fluctuations.

countries did not have this delay because shifting their significantly smaller percentages of import trade to other sources was a less onerous task.

Finally, the 1986 bombing raid seems to have made a lasting impression on Europe. The low level of imports from Libya have continued to remain at significantly depressed levels, up to the time of this writing. The Lockerbie bombing of December 1988 may have reinforced these results during the early 1990s when Libya came under suspicion for the bombing. This still leaves the American raid on Libya as the only explanation for the significant drop seen between April 1986 and January 1989.

B. EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS ON LIBYAN SPONSORED TERRORISM

As these case studies reveal, the ultimate goal of American policy since 1980 was to stop Qaddafi's sponsorship of terrorism. This section will use the chronology previously developed from State Department data to determine if there was any apparent effect on the amount of suspected Libyan terrorism. The same dates for maximum application of each American strategy will be used. Two measures of Libyan terrorism will be analyzed. The first will be the total number of incidents, regardless of the country involved. The second measure only include incidents against United States personnel or overseas installations. Each of these measurements will be compared for the first three case studies using periods before and after each strategy was employed. A comparison for the multilateral case study cannot be done because the State Department data does not include any documentation on Libyan terrorism after the air and arms embargo went into effect.

1. Case Study One

Using the chronology developed in chapter II, both measures of Libyan terrorism for the period between January 1980 and February 1982, will be compared to the measures between March 1982 and April 1984. These periods were chosen because they straddle the

March 1982 trade embargo in an equal manner, with 25 months before and 25 months after. The results are shown below:

	<u>Jan. 1980 - Feb. 1982</u>	<u>Mar. 1982 - Apr. 1984</u>	<u>Net Effect</u>
United States	2	0	100% Down
Others	21	12	43% Down

These comparisons show that the American trade embargo had a positive effect. Overall, Libyan terrorism decreased by 43 percent for the 25 months following the embargo when compared to the 25 months prior. Similarly, terrorist incidents against United States targets were completely eliminated for the 25 months following the embargo. It appears that the unilateral embargo did not have the desired effect on American allies in Europe but in spite of this, it does appear to have the desired effect on Libyan terrorism.

2. Case Study Two

The United States' request for European sanctions at the London Economic summit will be examined in a similar manner. The same technique will be used but the length of the periods will be altered in order not to overlap with the following case study, the April 15, 1986 bombing. As a result, the periods examined will be only 22 months in duration. The results are shown below:

	<u>Aug. 1982 - May 1984</u>	<u>Jun. 1984 - Mar. 1986</u>	<u>Net Effect</u>
United States	0	2	200% Up
Others	12	22	83% Up

Case study two appears to have a drastically negative effect on both Libyan terrorism directed at United States interests, as well as other nations. This diplomatic approach was also virtually ignored by western European states and does not appear to have any positive

results to show. It can also be argued that these first two case studies did not have significant impact on Libya's economy since they were fairly ineffective unilateral actions. If this is the case then the effect on Libyan sponsored terrorism was probably also insignificant and these results are just statistical anomalies resulting from the limited number of documented terrorist incidents.

3. Case Study Three

Once again, the same type of analysis will be done for the United States bombing raid on Libya. The periods examined will span 68 months on either side of the bombing. This duration was chosen for the sole reason that State Department data stops in December 1990, 68 months after the American raid. The results are shown below:

	<u>Jul. 1981 - Apr. 15, 1986</u>	<u>Apr. 15, 1986 - Dec. 1990</u>	<u>Net Effect</u>
United States	5	18	260% Up
Others	40	36	10% Down

The American bombing raid appears to have produced a marginal decrease in Libyan terrorism against other nations. This may be explained by the bias in reporting that might have tainted State Department data. As discussed earlier, after the fall from grace of the conspiracy theory, it is possible that American terrorism analysts began focusing on attacks against United States personnel and property with a resulting loss of emphasis on attacks against other nations. Even if this bias is not present in the data, there was only a marginal decrease in documented Libyan terrorism against others, which is not statistically relevant.

On the other hand, there can be no mistaking the drastic increase of Libyan backed terrorism attacks against American interests. Of the 18 attacks directed against the United States, the State Department concedes that 13 (over two thirds) of the attacks were revenge attacks occurring shortly after or on subsequent anniversaries of the American bombing. The effect of this tactic on Libyan terrorism directed against Americans was definitely not the one

desired by the Reagan administration when the raid was conducted. This raid did however, have a positive effect on American allies in Europe.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has examined four case studies which covered the four basic responses to state-sponsored terrorism that were laid out in Chapter I. It is now time to see if any of these responses are in agreement with academic studies on the deterrence of state-sponsored terrorism. The current literature on terrorism repeatedly brings forward a belief that state-sponsored terrorism should be the most easily deterred form of terrorism, with this deterrence taking the form of multilateral action (Case Study 4). The logic behind this reasoning begins with Hypothesis Five: If a state-sponsor's national interests are threatened then it will decrease its sponsorship of terrorism. Martha Crenshaw believes that the ability to deter terrorism "should be doubly applicable to the states that sponsor the terrorism of others or engage in it directly." (Crenshaw 1988, p. 18) Her rationale is directly linked to a state's "wider range of identifiable values" or, as stated in Hypothesis Five, a state's wide range of national interests. Jerrold M. Post goes further by saying that,

the primary goal of the state is survival and furthering national interests, and if the pursuit of terrorism threatens those goals, it can be reduced or abandoned in the face of outside threats. Thus we are arguing that the higher the level of authority, including complex corporate organizations and states supporting terrorism, the greater the rationale for the retaliatory tactic. . . . (Post 1988, p. 317)

Both authors implicitly accept that for states, unlike independent terrorist organizations, terrorism is not a *raison d'être*. Instead, a state's primary goal is its continued existence as a healthy functioning entity. This desire for continued recognition by the international system makes it imperative that a state-sponsor respond to actions which threaten its national interests. Paul Wilkinson brings this argument to a close by concluding that multilateral action will be the most effective strategy against Libyan-sponsored terrorism. He makes two specific recommendations regarding state-sponsored terrorism:

1. We must persuade all law-abiding states to join in a collective international measure to close down Libyan People's Bureaux and Syrian Embassies in their countries. . . . They should be shut down until Qaddafi abandons terrorism or is overthrown and replaced by a non-terrorist regime.

2. There is a potentially highly-effective weapon against sponsors of terrorism in the form of collective economic counter-measures by all the major industrial countries of the West. Dictators such as Qaddafi and Assad are highly dependent on Western markets, products, skills and technology. (Wilkinson 1988, pp. 104-105)

Implicit in Wilkinson's logic is the idea that sanctions become a much sharper weapon as more states join in supporting and enforcing these multilateral efforts. Thus, there is a firm belief in the current literature that it should be possible to deter state-sponsored terrorism through multilateral initiatives.

This thesis has shown that the best multilateral effort to date, the 1992 sanctions placed in effect against Libya for the Pan Am bombing, were ineffective. As early as 1988, Wilkinson recognized that efforts to "isolate Libya economically and diplomatically (were) being blocked by vested interests and 'fat cats', highly placed in the Mediterranean EEC states' governments." (Wilkinson 1988, p. 103) This insightful and predictive commentary on multilateral cooperation directed against state-sponsored terrorism is supported by the evidence presented in this thesis and can be explained in large part by Hypothesis Four⁷. The next section will critique American responses using the five hypotheses developed in Chapter 1. These hypotheses will call attention to criteria that may not have been fully understood or was misinterpreted by Washington policy-makers in their fight against Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

⁷ In addition to the economic ties of Hypothesis Four, ideological, definitional and other causes of non-cooperation discussed earlier also combine to ensure multilateral action against state-sponsored terrorism is very difficult to achieve. In the Libyan case it has been shown that economic interests clearly affect decisions to combat state-sponsored terrorism. The United Kingdom's belief that sanctions are not productive also shows an ideological difference of opinion on deterrence of terrorism. Finally, the United Nations' inability to reach consensus on an overall definition of terrorism shows the problems inherent in defining terrorism in a multilateral forum and hence, in orchestrating collective action.

A. JUDGING AMERICAN RESPONSES USING THE INITIAL HYPOTHESES

Prior to embarking on any of the responses studied in this thesis, decision makers must carefully examine each hypothesis to ensure the strategy behind the response is logical and has the potential to produce the desired results. This section will use hindsight to examine if American decision makers made logical choices with respect to each hypothesis.

1. Hypothesis One - If American national interests are threatened by Libyan terrorism, then the United States will take some unilateral action or campaign for multilateral initiatives that threaten Libyan national interests, in an attempt to deter this threatening behavior.

In reviewing the State Department's chronology developed in Chapter I, there is little evidence of a Libyan terrorist threat against American national interests prior to 1986. The chronology shows that between 1980 and 1985, there were only four documented terrorist attacks by Libya involving American property or personnel. Only one of these incidents, the El Al airport attacks, resulted in the death of United States citizens. The other three incidents: the murder of a Libyan student in Utah, the missile attack on two United States F-14's, and the alleged 1985 plot to kill dissidents in the United States, obviously offended American sensibilities but they did not represent grave threats to American national interests. Arguably, the incidental death of five American's in the El Al ticket counter massacres can be seen as an attack against United States' interests but in a broader sense, a counter-argument can be made that these five American's were just in the wrong place at the wrong time and no threat was intended against American interests.

Judging the threat of Libyan-sponsored terrorism with these rigid standards of targeted American personnel or property, it is difficult to justify the 1986 decision to use a firm military policy of retaliation when the threat was so minimal. However, as pointed out earlier, the threat during the early 1980s was grossly distorted by the Red Peril theory of Soviet-sponsorship. Looking at the threat through this lens shows why the State Department documented events as obscure as Libyan subversion in Gambia. Viewed through the

conspiracy theory, these events represented threats to the Cold War balance of power and thus a direct threat to American interests.

With hindsight, it is easy to give American decision makers a failing grade on their ability to judge the threat of Libyan-sponsored terrorism between 1980 and 1985. Clearly the threat was virtually non-existent but the conspiracy theory was in vogue and led key decision makers to believe the threat was larger than life.

Continuing with this analysis of American strategy, after April 15, 1986, the threat of Libyan-sponsored terrorism became quite tangible. United States citizens were targeted directly, American bases overseas were bombed and in all cases there appeared to be a clear Libyan connection. In 1986, after the bombing raid, the time appeared ripe for a firm military response because the threat was escalating drastically, even if this growth was a result of the American bombing raid. The United States was not prepared for the Libyan response and Washington opted to back off, not pursuing firm military responses to each Libyan reprisal. In addition, Washington grossly misinterpreted the results of the 1986 bombing raid. Evidence of this distortion can be found in a 1988 speech by Ambassador Busby, the United States counter-terrorism czar. In this speech he states that "we will pressure states that support terrorist groups and use terrorism as a tool of their foreign policy. . . we will penalize these states with all means at our disposal and urge others to do the same." (Busby 1988) This speech implied that the United States was dedicated to a firm military policy but as discussed above, this policy was not implemented after the 1986 bombing raid, when America absorbed several Libyan reprisal attacks with no military response. Ambassador Busby was not satisfied with presenting a false impression of United States resolve, he continued by presenting a completely erroneous summary of the results achieved by the American raid on Libya, saying,

Qaddafi learned that his support for international terrorism would not be without cost. And (sic) he changed his behavior, which after all is the objective of our policy. Libya's involvement in terrorism declined from 19 incidents in 1985 to seven the following year and six last year. (Busby, 1988)

This belief that the American raid produced positive results is contrary to published State Department documents reviewed in this thesis and appears to be a clear example of creative statistical analysis. This study has shown that the net effect of the raid was the opposite of that presented by Ambassador Busby, namely a 260 percent increase in Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks against the United States, not a 60 percent reduction. Ambassador Busby appears to be oblivious of another effect of the bombing raid which this thesis views as central, the effect on European imports from Libya. Finally, Ambassador Busby's speech made it clear that the United States does not "accede to terrorist demands." This inflexible diplomatic stance flies in the face of the firm military but flexible diplomatic strategy which will be recommended in the next section of this thesis.

2. Hypotheses Two and Three - If European national interests are not threatened, then European states will not be inclined to support United States actions and conversely; If European national interests are threatened, then European states will take some kind of action against Libyan national interests which may coincide with United States actions.

The only American response that produced any threat to European interests was the American bombing raid. This thesis has argued that Washington purposely engineered this threat to gain European support for the economic isolation of Libya. The critique of American actions using these hypotheses is twofold. First, the threat, as discussed above, was not severe enough to risk the potential cost of international condemnation that resulted from American actions. Second, even if the threat was perceived as drastic enough to justify such a firm military response, the United States did not follow through with this firm military strategy. Once begun, a firm military strategy should be followed through until the target audience (Europe, in this case) views the threat (Libyan-sponsored terrorism) as acute enough to fully endorse and vigorously enforce a strict embargo on Libya. Since this point was not reached, the United States was the sole recipient of international condemnation. If the United States had continued its defensive military responses and the threat to Europe had reached

unacceptable levels, a multilateral coalition would have become engaged in the fight against Libyan-sponsored terrorism and it would have been more difficult to pin the blame solely on the United States.

Both Hypotheses Two and Three were confirmed by the findings in this thesis. Europe was loath to take any action against Libya during America's first two attempts at economic isolation. However, after the United States raised the threat level on the continent, all states examined, including Spain after a six month delay, significantly decreased their imports from Libya. These results suggest that a firm military response can produce multilateral support, even from states which were initially reluctant to become involved. When the United States did not use military force and attempted to address the issue in the United Nations after the Lockerbie bombing, the resulting sanctions were not effective. These results point out the fact that states have a varying level of tolerance for terrorism. These differences stem from inherently different levels of exposure to terrorism which may result in a population's psychological numbing to terrorism, dissimilar cultural heritages, and maybe even varying regional attitudes toward terrorism. These different tolerances to the violence generated by terrorism are not well understood by American decision makers who tend to see this issue in black and white terms. The United States feels compelled to react to every incident of terrorist violence.

3. Hypothesis Four - If a European country has strong economic ties with Libya, then its ability or willingness to take strong economic action will decrease.

Again, with the advantage of hindsight it is easy to argue that American policy makers failed to adequately weigh Europe's dependence on Libyan exports. It is feasible that continued American raids on Libya could have raised the terrorist threat level in Europe enough to force support for a stiff program of official economic sanctions. However, Washington miscalculated if they thought one bombing raid was adequate to accomplish this goal. Again, this firm military strategy is not for the weak hearted. The initial criticism will

be immense and if the strength of economic ties are miscalculated, the instigator may be left holding the blame when the will to continue a firm military response ebbs. A potentially more damaging outcome is possible if the instigator topples the terrorist regime by military force alone, because multilateral cooperation could not be achieved due to strong economic interdependence. In this case, the instigator can be condemned by the international community and the only justification possible is to argue that the military removal of a sovereign government was completely defensive in nature.

The six month delay in Spain's reduction of imports from Libya after the American bombing raid gives credence to this hypothesis. It validates the idea that a states' willingness or ability to impose economic sanctions on a particular country is directly related to the strength and scope of its trade relations with that country.

4. Hypothesis Five - If Libyan national interests are severely threatened, then Libya will decrease its sponsorship of terrorism.

The logic behind this hypothesis is sound but cannot be confirmed by the results of this study because no significant correlation between threats to Libyan national interests and decreases in Libyan-sponsored terrorism was found. This does not mean Hypothesis Five is invalid. This thesis supports two possible conclusions regarding this hypothesis. First, the hypothesis may not be valid because the state sponsor has consciously subordinated other national interests to continue terrorism in the pursuit of an overriding national objective or even personal objectives for a totalitarian leader. The second conclusion is that Hypothesis Five is valid but the responses studied in this thesis did not threaten Libyan national interests enough to cause a perceptible change of behavior.

However, the United States' policies regarding Libya can still be critiqued using Hypothesis Five. The American reluctance to even recognize Libyan grievances or national objectives can be soundly criticized. During the entire period under investigation in this thesis, the United States was urging Israel to do just this with Palestinian grievances.

American policy makers during the period examined would be hard pressed to show they had even a rudimentary knowledge of Libyan goals and or grievances. Certainly no one in Washington was advocating that Libyan goals or grievances had some grounds for legitimacy. Granted, Qaddafi's goals and grievances may not have been well articulated, even in his own mind, but denying him a forum for addressing these grievances or achieving some recognition of his goals may have entailed an even greater threat to Qaddafi, thus ensuring he continued the use of terrorism.

B. THE MOST EFFECTIVE STRATEGY AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

The American responses to Libyan-sponsored terrorism examined in this thesis do provide the basis for hypothesizing on a more effective strategy against state-sponsored terrorism. In investigating the four strategies used by the United States, this thesis has confirmed what some may have suspected from the outset: that all of the American responses were ineffective because none of them harmed Libya's national interests enough to bend Qaddafi to American wishes. However, the unilateral military response embodied by the 1986 bombing raid was effective in deterring a significant percentage of European trade with Libya. Unfortunately, this strategy was also directly responsible for a drastic 260 percent increase in Libyan-sponsored terrorism against the United States, an unwanted side-effect. The multilateral response advocated by the current literature on terrorism was also partially successful. Sanctions, although ineffective, were actually agreed upon by the United Nations.

Since neither the unilateral military option nor multilateral initiatives produced total satisfaction, it is the conclusion of this thesis that a synthesis of these two partially successful strategies would be more effective. The ground work for just such a strategy is laid out by Paul Huth (1988) in his classic study, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. In this study, Huth posits that a firm but flexible diplomatic strategy is more likely to result in successful deterrence than a tit-for-tat or a conciliatory strategy. In the tit-for-tat strategy,

escalation toward war is much higher because each side responds to the others actions with equal or greater measures, ratcheting what would otherwise be isolated incidents in the direction of total war. In the conciliatory strategy, a victim state cedes to the aggressor's demands, in effect rewarding aggression while providing no deterrent for further aggressive actions. The strategy adapted from Huth's firm-but-flexible policy to fit a counter-terrorism policy directed at state-sponsors becomes a firm military policy coupled with a flexible diplomatic stance. The flexible diplomatic strategy is imperative because it gives the state-sponsor an other option besides terrorism. Without this diplomatic alternative, the long-range effect of a firm military strategy will "produce generations of terrorists as well as strengthening other motivations." (Post 1990, p. 65) A state-sponsor must be given an out or as George Kennan recognizes, it will, like an individual, be driven to terrorism: "Wrong a man. . . deny him all redress, exile him again if he complains, gag him if he cries out, strike him in the face if he struggles, and at last he will stab and throw bombs." (Kennan 1891, vol. 1, p. 248) Acknowledging legitimate grievances made by a state-sponsor and channeling them into proper international forums for arbitration can provide a chance for the state to save face, possibly realize some of its objectives and most importantly, break its psychological dependence on terrorism as the only viable tool of foreign policy.

Firm military responses to state-sponsored terrorism are critical for a number of reasons. First, reprisal raids and even preemptive attacks send signals to the sponsor that this unacceptable behavior will have a direct cost associated with it. Second and more importantly, they send a message to the international community designed to prompt multilateral action. Continued military responses to terrorism will cause terrorism to escalate and force the target audience (the international community) to take some form of multilateral action. This message was received by the European community after the American bombing raid and a multilateral reduction in trade was the result, in spite of their original reluctance to endorse economic sanctions. The full potential of a firm military strategy was not realized by the United States, since no further retaliatory raids were conducted in response to the Libyan

reprisals. Finally, military responses such as reprisal raids and preemptive attacks would in all likelihood, increase the world-wide threat of terrorism enough to make many states believe their national interests were threatened. This change to their perception of the threat should cause them to adopt strict multilateral sanctions, thus reliving the victim state of the need to continue military responses. If this point is reached the threat to the sponsor state's national interests now comes from a multilateral group and the need for military raids are eliminated, unless of course the sanctions are lifted.

The costs associated with such a strategy are extremely high. The actions of states that have engaged in reprisal attacks against terrorism sponsors have consistently been condemned. For example, the United Nations condemned both America's raid on Tripoli and the Israel's raid on Tunis. Israel had a long history of firm military responses and continually paid a high diplomatic price in the international community. In addition, this firm military strategy of reprisals and preemption did little to stem Palestinian terrorism. It was not until Israel adopted the second half of this concluding strategy, a flexible diplomatic approach, that any headway was made in curbing Palestinian-sponsored terrorism. However, as unpalatable as the firm military response may be to some, this study of responses to Libyan-sponsored terrorism has shown that without a strong military response there was little or no multilateral cooperation against Libya.

C. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EACH STRATEGY

This thesis has identified five possible strategies to counter state-sponsored terrorism: a unilateral military strategy, a unilateral economic strategy, a unilateral diplomatic strategy, a multilateral strategy of economic isolation, and a hybrid strategy of firm unilateral military response coupled with a flexible diplomatic stance, designed to induce multilateral support for strict economic isolation. The final hybrid approach has been argued as the most effective. However, each of these strategies, including the firm but flexible approach have identifiable

costs and benefits which should be fully understood prior to choosing a specific course of action. This section will identify these positive and negative aspects of each strategy.

1. Unilateral Economic Strategy

The most obvious cost associated with this strategy is the detrimental impact on domestic commercial entities. In the Libyan case, the unilateral American embargo hurt American corporations which had major investments in Libya. These unavoidable costs must be weighed against the potential impact this tact will produce in the target country. In the Libyan case, the impact was minimized by international supply and demand forces. As stated previously, United States corporations bore the brunt of the punishment burden while the impact on Libya was minimized by increased European imports. This approach is not effective unless the international community has some incentive to not take advantage of the increased supply produced by a unilateral embargo. As shown in this study, it is difficult to achieve this incentive with anything less than military force.

The single advantage of this strategy is that the international community will not condemn a state for using it.

2. Unilateral Diplomatic Strategy

Diplomatic pressure on a sovereign state will rarely cause it to take action that runs counter to its national interests. Economic well-being and crucial trade relationships appear to be strong national interests which states are unlikely to alter or jeopardize in response to diplomatic pressure. The trade statistics examined in this thesis show that Europe completely ignored American diplomatic requests for sanctions against Libya. Using the number of terrorist incidents as a gauge, it appears that this strategy produces more terrorism. By referring back to the number of terrorist incidents that targeted American personnel or property after the push by Washington for European cooperation on economic sanctions⁸, it

⁸ See Case Study Two, p. 58.

appears Qaddafi was uninterested in targeting United States interests during the two years leading up to the London Economic Summit. However, for the 22 months following the summit, Libya was involved in two attacks on American targets. Apparently, Qaddafi grew to resent American diplomatic efforts aimed at isolating Libya and began to target United States' interests directly. Again, Qaddafi used the only tool he felt was effective against American diplomatic efforts to isolate him.

3. Unilateral Military Strategy

The benefits of this strategy are numerous, especially when the military strength of the countries involved are as disproportionate as that of Libya and the United States. First, military supremacy can be virtually guaranteed, ensuring that military casualties during military responses will be low. Second, the inability of the state-sponsor to answer the military raid with equal military force ensures he will respond with more terrorism attacks, providing additional justification for continued reprisal attacks. This will increase the international communities perception of the sponsor state as a growing threat. Third, the actual application of military force itself represents a threat to the sponsors national interests. This threat must then be taken into account during in the decision making process in which continued sponsorship of terrorism is determined. Finally, if a policy of firm military response is well communicated, it becomes a deterrent threat in its own right. This communication of intent helps justify action when it is ultimately required.

The disadvantages of the firm military strategy are also numerous. In the case of Libya, with a charismatic leader having a paranoid conviction that the United States was out to ruin him, military reprisals will only further this paranoia. Along a similar line, Donnatella della Porta (1992, p. 15) documents increased radicalization of terrorist movements when excessive military force is used. This movement toward increased terrorism among the sponsor's followers is difficult to avoid if the military balance is totally lopsided. When this is the case, the sponsor citizens will begin to see the problem as one of "absolute injustice"

(Della Porta, 1988). Finally, reliance on this strategy will produce much international condemnation. Israel experienced criticism for several decades while this policy was the central pillar of its counter-terrorism strategy. The United States was also condemned by the United Nations for using this strategy on Tripoli as well.

4. Multilateral Strategy

This thesis has shown that the major disadvantage of a multilateral strategy is that it doesn't achieve an effective threat to the sponsor states' national interests, unless the international community as a whole views the sponsor state as a threat. Even events as heinous as the Pan Am 103 and the UTA 772 bombings did not overcome the conflicting interests found in the international community. The sole advantage of pursuing this strategy is that it will in no way be condemned by the international community. Submitting resolutions calling for strict economic sanctions is an accepted form of behavior which will bring attention to the problem. Unfortunately, this attention alone produces little threat to the sponsors national interests.

5. Firm Military and Flexible Diplomatic Strategy


This strategy takes the disadvantage of a military response, namely the further radicalization of the terrorists and uses it to make the international community view the state sponsor with greater alarm. By making this disadvantage work to gain international recognition of the threat, the full weight of the international community can be brought to bear on the state sponsor. This full cooperation and strict enforcement of sanctions would be the true test of Hypothesis Five. Without past examples to go by, the two likely results of these sanctions would be a cessation of terrorism by the sponsor state or continued terrorism until the state disintegrated internally. In a pragmatic way, this strategy is advantageous regardless of which outcome results because the sponsorship of terrorism will eventually stop.

The flexible diplomatic stance is critical to avoid the disintegration of the sponsor state. Theoretically, the states' *raison d'etre* is to remain a functioning entity. If this concept is accurate then the decision to cease sponsorship will occur prior to disintegration of the state. At this point it is critical that every effort be made to arbitrate the grievances of the sponsor state. If this done in a fair manner, the sponsor may then embrace recognized international forums for arbitrating issues as a new tool for furthering national interests instead of reverting to the old tool of terrorism.

This strategy is far from perfect but it does represent an improvement over the four strategies that this thesis has shown to be ineffective. This strategy is not one to be used against mildly irritating acts of state-sponsored terrorism. The vast increases in violence inherent in this strategy should be taken into account by decision makers before they put it to use. This entire thesis should also cause counter-terrorism policy makers to place the threat of state-sponsored terrorism into proper perspective. The costs incurred by the United States in its fight against Libyan-sponsored terrorism are significant, yet the results are negligible. In some cases the results were counter-productive and the United States paid a greater price than if it had not responded at all. Theoretically, as the literature suggests, state-sponsored terrorism should be deterrable but the cost of such deterrence should be seen with open eyes. A blindness to the resulting costs associated with each strategy seems to typify American responses to Libyan-sponsored terrorism. On the whole, a strategy of doing nothing may have better served American national interests.


APPENDIX A. (COUNTRY IMPORTS/TOTAL IMPORTS, CORRECTED
FOR OIL PRICE FLUCTUATIONS)

German imports/Total German imports




Italian imports/Total Italian imports

corrected for oil price fluctuations




Netherland imports/Total imports

corrected for oil price fluctuations




French imports/Total French imports

corrected for oil price fluctuations




Great Britain imports/Total imports



American imports/Total imports

corrected for oil price fluctuations



APPENDIX B. (PERCENT LIBYAN IMPORTS OF TOTAL IMPORTS)

Percent Libyan Imports of Total EEC Imports

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
79	0.94	1.09	1.13	0.96	1.06	0.92	1.03	1.22	1.12	1.06	1.17	1.85
80	1.56	1.04	1.18	1.33	1.18	1.29	1.14	1.10	1.23	1.10	0.95	1.63
81	1.44	1.34	1.29	1.57	1.87	1.58	1.47	1.46	0.79	0.43	0.60	1.06
82	0.90	1.21	0.97	0.84	1.06	1.18	1.28	1.90	2.12	2.18	2.09	2.14
83	1.89	1.48	1.17	1.25	1.13	1.22	1.46	1.74	1.08	1.36	1.20	1.56
84	1.11	1.23	1.45	1.37	1.29	1.48	1.00	1.18	1.07	0.84	1.07	1.42
85	1.46	1.23	1.12	1.16	1.58	1.44	1.16	1.64	0.89	1.24	1.16	1.31
86	1.18	0.67	0.92	0.74	0.64	0.61	0.56	0.64	0.61	0.43	0.55	0.45

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (United Nations, NY), 1979-86

Percent Libyan Imports of Total German Imports

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
79	1.81	1.61	1.56	1.29	1.69	1.25	1.36	1.40	1.19	1.16	1.35	1.36
80	2.76	2.17	2.54	2.60	2.38	2.08	2.36	2.20	1.93	1.90	1.77	3.22
81	3.03	2.56	2.23	2.24	3.17	2.12	2.20	2.72	1.26	0.83	0.92	1.41
82	1.28	1.64	0.96	0.55	1.57	2.31	1.73	2.54	2.54	2.66	2.97	2.68
73	1.93	1.56	1.11	0.84	2.05	1.58	1.78	1.59	1.38	2.12	1.52	2.14
84	1.25	2.13	1.39	1.69	1.96	1.82	1.41	0.94	1.23	1.00	1.07	1.08
85	1.73	1.73	1.34	0.96	1.72	1.48	1.24	1.73	1.20	0.82	1.13	1.28
86	1.11	0.80	0.42	0.44	0.43	0.39	0.45	0.47	0.32	0.24	0.48	0.47

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (United Nations, NY), 1979-86

Percent Libyan Imports of Total Italian Imports

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
79	3.46	3.54	3.36	2.51	3.64	2.51	3.04	3.88	2.89	3.32	3.02	4.09
80	4.50	2.16	2.58	3.80	3.33	4.83	2.92	2.40	4.03	4.18	3.03	3.98
81	4.16	4.34	4.06	4.94	4.50	6.00	4.47	2.55	2.50	0.97	1.15	2.61
82	1.69	3.03	2.38	2.85	1.23	2.07	2.39	4.49	5.61	4.40	4.03	5.04
83	4.30	2.21	3.08	2.90	2.57	4.13	3.98	5.52	2.21	1.97	2.63	4.47
84	3.36	2.11	4.72	3.42	2.86	4.74	2.53	5.02	2.72	2.54	4.06	1.84
85	5.65	3.22	3.01	3.62	4.59	4.42	3.49	4.39	2.16	5.50	4.25	2.99
86	4.87	2.20	2.88	2.40	1.30	1.46	1.40	2.47	.072	1.04	1.74	1.17

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (United Nations, NY), 1979-86

Percent Libyan Imports of Total Netherlands Imports

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
79	0.34	0.67	0.49	0.36	0.23	0.01	0.19	0.25	0.01	0.28	0.92	0.44
80	0.52	0.80	0.76	0.37	0.16	0.01	0.02	0.12	0.05	0.08	0.26	0.51
81	0.50	0.88	0.01	0.51	1.03	0.06	0.30	0.18	0.09	0.54	0.20	0.49
82	0.26	1.07	0.04	0.29	1.47	0.78	0.64	0.42	0.94	2.32	1.35	0.65
83	2.99	3.62	1.90	2.36	2.58	1.62	0.76	1.92	0.07	0.39	0.74	0.98
84	0.00	0.92	0.59	0.87	0.52	0.91	0.55	0.52	0.64	0.55	0.90	0.88
85	0.44	0.96	0.60	1.44	0.74	0.52	0.40	1.30	0.14	0.56	0.83	0.59
86	0.26	0.28	0.07	0.34	0.26	0.25	0.27	0.32	0.00	0.09	0.05	0.01

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (United Nations, NY), 1979-86

Percent Libyan Imports of Total French Imports

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
79	0.55	0.56	0.88	0.58	0.56	0.70	0.67	0.83	0.38	0.16	0.62	0.44
80	1.03	0.36	0.41	0.58	0.25	0.62	0.51	0.71	0.56	0.10	0.04	0.84
81	0.16	0.21	0.71	1.04	0.49	0.72	0.81	0.48	0.07	0.00	0.18	0.17
82	0.59	0.16	0.16	0.00	0.02	0.23	0.52	0.32	0.60	1.45	1.18	1.22
83	1.11	1.26	0.33	0.46	0.26	0.73	0.90	1.70	0.73	0.85	0.85	0.76
84	1.14	1.40	0.78	1.05	0.99	0.74	0.12	0.87	1.19	0.67	0.32	0.31
85	0.68	0.55	1.24	0.49	0.01	0.36	1.08	1.36	0.38	1.07	0.49	0.93
86	0.18	0.23	0.09	0.70	0.36	0.36	0.17	0.23	0.47	0.13	0.07	0.22

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (United Nations, NY), 1979-86

Percent Libyan Import of Total Spanish Imports

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
79	3.34	5.90	1.40	1.24	3.25	3.18	2.53	3.35	4.30	4.02	2.82	2.10
80	2.77	6.39	4.16	4.58	2.44	2.67	1.56	6.15	2.32	6.39	1.09	4.49
81	6.38	2.15	5.17	3.54	4.08	5.55	4.26	6.64	1.07	5.68	2.85	2.96
82	2.44	3.93	1.10	1.68	5.09	2.27	0.67	6.05	1.77	3.16	6.09	4.54
83	3.38	3.31	2.53	5.37	4.21	3.46	3.01	2.21	2.62	1.61	5.64	2.50
84	3.54	5.22	6.01	2.89	1.48	5.63	3.59	3.29	1.38	5.31	2.63	2.91
85	4.16	4.54	1.33	3.86	2.68	2.62	4.02	4.52	4.86	4.17	6.01	2.11
86	2.93	1.70	2.96	3.81	1.46	3.63	3.31	4.00	3.20	2.82	1.71	1.43

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (United Nations, NY), 1979-86

Percent Libyan Imports of Total British Imports

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
79	0.24	0.34	0.25	0.04	0.06	0.13	0.08	0.18	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08
80	0.30	0.09	0.06	0.01	1.29	0.05	0.08	0.14	0.12	0.01	0.09	0.02
81	0.17	0.01	*	*	*	*	*	*	1.12	0.08	0.57	0.51
82	0.19	0.10	0.60	0.12	0.53	0.38	1.02	1.81	0.88	0.77	0.56	0.38
83	0.12	0.19	0.28	0.35	0.25	0.52	0.35	0.36	0.67	0.44	0.33	0.17
84	0.24	0.05	0.00	0.40	0.17	0.13	0.33	0.21	0.41	0.21	0.01	0.23
85	0.05	0.06	0.36	0.45	0.48	0.49	0.65	0.52	0.44	0.25	0.11	0.57
86	0.13	0.13	0.21	0.10	0.27	0.27	0.11	0.06	0.23	0.17	0.10	0.12

*Data not available

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (United Nations, NY), 1979-86

Percent Libyan Imports of Total American Imports

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
79	2.47	1.60	1.99	2.36	2.49	2.32	2.55	2.83	3.21	2.65	2.52	3.06
80	1.87	3.94	3.29	3.57	2.81	2.83	2.68	2.72	3.19	2.34	2.44	3.60
81	3.67	3.21	2.20	4.37	2.29	2.81	1.40	1.12	1.38	0.60	0.55	0.60
82	1.15	0.75	0.18	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.03
83	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
84	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
85	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.03
86	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, (United Nations, NY), 1979-86

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